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0UE8TI0N8 PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a

statement in an opinion column that an elected official changed
his position on a matter of public concern during a hotly contested political campaign is defamatory under Utah law?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a

statement in an opinion column that an elected official "attempts
to manipulate the press" is defamatory under Utah law?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that the

views expressed by a political columnist that an elected official
changed his position on a matter of public concern are not
protected

political

opinion

under

the

U.S.

Supreme

Court's

opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal?
4.
consider

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously refuse to

whether

"opinions"

expressed

in

op-ed

columns

are

afforded greater protection under Article I, Section 15 of the
Utah Constitution than under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution when the issue was raised as an affirmative defense
in the trial court, was briefed extensively by the parties on
appeal, and was the subject of a supporting amicus brief?
5.
public

Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a

official

libel plaintiff
-iv-

need

not produce

"clear and

convincing evidence" of a media defendants' actual malice in
order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment,
but need produce only sufficient evidence to raise "the possibility that a jury might find actual malice?"
6.

Is evidence that a newspaper publisher sought the

advice of legal counsel and had his managing editor review an
opinion column before it was published sufficiently probative of
the publisher's alleged actual malice so as to require denial of
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment?
7.

Is evidence that a newspaper publisher printed a

libel plaintiff's

letter to the editor as a rebuttal to an

opinion column probative of the publisher's actual malice?
8.

Is evidence that an editor knew that

one

(of

several) of a columnist's sources for an allegedly defamatory
statement

concerning

an

elected

official

was

the

official's

"political enemy" sufficiently probative of actual malice so as
to require denial of an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment?
9.

Is a statement reflecting an editor's knowledge

five months after an allegedly defamatory column was published
probative of the editor's state of mind at the time the column
was published?
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OPINION BELOW
As of the date this petition was prepared, the Court of
Appeals' decision below was not published.

Copies of the Court

of Appeals' majority and dissenting opinions are attached hereto
in Appendix "A".
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals' decision was issued May 28, 1992.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition pursuant to
Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a)

(1991) which

grants

the Utah

Supreme Court jurisdiction over "a judgment of the court of
appeals."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The constitutional provisions and statutes which are
relevant to this petition are set forth in Appendix "B".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

case

stems

from

certain

allegedly

defamatory

statements contained in three op-ed columns published on June 27,
1988, July 2, 1988 and November 20, 1988 on the opinion page of
the Daily Spectrum.

The June and July columns criticized plain-

tiff for changing his political position from being opposed to
municipal power in the city of LaVerkin during the 1987 mayoral
campaign to supporting municipal power after he took office as
Mayor.

The

November

column

accused

-1-

plaintiff

of

repeated

attempts to "manipulate the press."
are attached hereto in Appendix "C."

Copies of the three columns
Plaintiff sued the colum-

nist, his editor, the publisher of the newspaper and the newspaper.

In a series of rulings, Judge Phillip Eves of the Fifth

District

(a) granted summary judgment as to publisher Donald

Hogun and editor Brent Goodey on all claims stemming from the
June and July 1988 columns because plaintiff failed to establish
a prima facie case of actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence (R. 3 63) ; (b) granted summary judgment as to columnist
Rick Guldan on the claims arising from the June and July columns
because

Guldan7s

statements

were

constitutionally

protected

expressions of opinion and thus, not actionable (R. 360); and (c)
dismissed the claim against editor Brent Goodey for statements in
his

November

1988

column

defamatory under Utah law.

because

the

statements

were

not

(R. 102).

Following briefing on defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the United States Supreme Court decided Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal, and plaintiff moved for reconsideration.
The

trial

court

subsequently

issued

a

memorandum

opinion analyzing Milkovich. upheld the Court's prior rulings and
certified as final under URCP 54(b) all orders entered in the
case.

(R. 422) .

Copies of the Memorandum Opinions and Judgment
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of

Dismissal

by

the

District

Court

are

attached

hereto

in

Appendix "D."
Plaintiff subsequently appealed.
In a split decision, the majority opinion of the Court
of Appeals held (a) that the assertion by Guldan that the plaintiff changed his position on the issue of "municipal power" was
capable of defamatory meaning and not constitutionally protected
opinion

under

the U.S. Constitution

whether

it was protected

and

refused

to consider

opinion under the Utah Constitution

(Slip Op. at 5-12); (b) that summary judgment for publisher Hogun
and editor Goodey was proper with respect to the June Column, but
improper with respect to the July column because plaintiff's
eventual burden at trial was irrelevant to a motion for summary
judgment and therefore, the case should go to trial because a
reasonable

jury could

find that Goodey

and Hogun acted with

actual malice (Id. at 12-16); and (c) that Goodey7s accusation
that plaintiff "attempts to manipulate the press" was possibly

1

By order dated February 1, 1991, this Court exercised its authority and
poured-over the case to the court of appeals for disposition. The Court of
Appeals, sua sponte. requested additional briefing on the jurisdiction of the
appellate court to hear the Rule 54(b) certification and subsequently issued
its opinion on the merits of the appeal on May 28, 1992.
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susceptible to a defamatory meaning under Utah law and thus
2
created a jury issue. (id. at 16-18)•
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The Parties.

Plaintiff Terry West, at all times relevant herein, was
the duly elected mayor of LaVerkin, Utah (R. 275).

Defendant

Donald Hogun is the publisher of The Daily Spectrum and has been
so since 1986 (R. 275).

Defendant Brent Goodey is the managing

editor of The Daily Spectrum and has been so since 1987 (R. 276).
Defendant Rick Guldan, at all times relevant to this action, was
a columnist for The Daily Spectrum (R. 276).
2

The June 27, 1988 Guldan Column.

The June column appeared on the Opinion page of the
newspaper and showed Guldan's photograph and by-line.
In his June column, Guldan criticized plaintiff for
several items, including, among other things, for changing his
political position from being opposed to municipal power during

1

The dissent argued that neither the
position on the issue of municipal power
the press" are susceptible of defamatory
trial court properly applied "heightened
summary judgment. (Slip Op. at 19-22).
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assertion that plaintiff changed his
or that he "attempts to manipulate
meaning under Utah law and that the
scrutiny" on defendants' motion for

the 1987 Mayoral campaign to supporting municipal power after he
took office as Mayor (R. 277-78).
The

issue

of

"municipal

power"

was

a

controversial

issue in the City of LaVerkin prior to the publication of the
columns in question
relating

(R, 278, Complaint f

to plaintiff's

political

10)•

position

The statements

on municipal

power

were based on the following sources:
(a)

Guldan's personal observations of comments made by

citizens at City Council meetings where plaintiff was accused of
changing the position he had taken in 1987 during the campaign of
opposing municipal power (R. 339); and
(b)

Guldan's

conversations

with

several

LaVerkin

residents (R. 339).
3.

Plaintiffs July 1, 1988 Letter to the Editor,

On July 1, 1988, plaintiff met with publisher Hogun at
the newspaper's offices and gave Hogun a Letter to the Editor
"refuting" the statements in the June Guldan column (R, 280).
true and

correct copy of plaintiff's

(A

Letter to the Editor as

published is attached hereto in Appendix " E " ) .
4.

The July 2, 1988 Guldan Column,

The July column appeared on the Opinion page of the
newspaper

and

was

accompanied

by

Rick

Guldan's

by-line

and

photograph and an Editor's Note describing it as a response to

-5-

the Letter to the Editor written by plaintiff which was being
published simultaneously.

The July Guldan column was reviewed

and approved by legal counsel prior to publication (R. 281).
5.

The November 20, 1988 Goodev Column.

On November 20, 1988 defendant Brent Goodey wrote a
column appearing on the opinion page of the newspaper under his
by-line and with his photograph.

In his column, Goodey expressed

his view that two feuding local public officials, one of which
was plaintiff, repeatedly "attempted] to manipulate the press."
6.

Publisher Donald Hogun's Involvement and State of
Mind.

Publisher Hogun did not review the June or July Guldan
columns prior to publication (R. 281-83).

On July 1, 1988, Hogun

met with St. George attorney Tim Anderson for the purpose of
discussing the June 27, 1988 Guldan column, plaintiff's Letter to
the Editor and what course of action the newspaper should take
under the circumstances (R. 282).
Based upon advice of counsel, Hogun published plaintiff's Letter to the Editor with an editor's note, next to the
July Guldan column and took no further action or investigation (R
282).

Attorney Anderson expressed his opinion to publisher Hogun

that, with a single exception not relevant to this petition,
plaintiff's

complaints

expressions

of

Guldan's

about

Guldan's

opinions
-6-

to

June
which

column
a

concerned

retraction

or

clarification was not necessary nor appropriate (R. 282). Hogun
asked attorney Anderson to review and approve the July Guldan
column prior to publication

(R. 283), which Anderson did (R.

347) .
7.

Editor Goodey*s Involvement and State of Mind,

Goodey was the Managing Editor of the Daily Spectrum at
the time of publication of the June and July Guldan columns and
reviewed the same prior to publication (R. 283).

Editor Goodey

made no substantive changes to the Guldan columns (R, 283)•
As managing editor, Goodey had reviewed hundreds of
stories and columns written by defendant Guldan prior to June
1988 (R. 283)•

Goodey considered Guldan to be an experienced,

reliable and accurate reporter (R. 283) .

Goodey did not doubt

and had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the factual information in the Gulden columns and made no effort to independently
verify any information in the columns (R. 284) .

Guldan's July

column was reviewed and approved prior to publication by attorney
Anderson and Goodey relied on Anderson's review and approval in
publishing said column (R. 286).
ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals' majority opinion is a troubling
decision which has many profound and far reaching implications,
not only because it alters the jurisprudential landscape of the
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law of libel in Utah, but also because it dramatically impacts
how journalism hereafter will be practiced in the state.
As discussed below, the majority opinion substantially
and incorrectly rewrites the law of libel in Utah, is contradictory to decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other
panel decisions of the Court of Appeals, and punishes the press
for engaging in what heretofore had been recognized and encouraged as responsible journalistic behavior.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE STATEMENT IN AN OP-ED COLUMN THAT AN
ELECTED OFFICIAL "ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THE
PRESS" IS DEFAMATORY UNDER UTAH LAW.
The Court of Appeals, relying upon a secondary meaning

from Webster's Dictionary of the word "manipulate" held that the
mere "possibility of debate" concerning whether the statement is
defamatory required the trial judge to send the issue to the
jury.

(Slip Op. at 16-19.)

This holding emasculates the trial

judge's function in the judicial process because the trial court
is no longer required to evaluate allegedly defamatory statements.

Rather, he or she is required to search for any "possi-

ble" defamatory meaning attributable to the subject statement.
This holding runs counter to prior rulings from this Court.

See

Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah 1979) (holding that a
court must adopt the more innocuous of two potential interpretations in determining whether a statement is slanderous per se) ;
-8-

Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) (dismissing libel claim
despite fact that it is at least possible to debate whether having one's picture taken with Senator Hatch without consent is
defamatory).
II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION WILL UNAVOIDABLY CHILL
ROBUST COMMENT AND DEBATE ON CONTROVERSIAL
POLITICAL ISSUES THROUGH ITS INCORRECT APPLICATION OF MILKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL.
In its landmark decision of Milkovich v. Lorain Jour-

nal, 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990) the United States Supreme
Court enunciated a test for differentiating between actionable
false statements of fact and non-actionable false statements of
opinion.

The Court held that statements relating to matters of

public concern will receive full constitutional protection where
the statements "do not contain a provably false factual connotation."

Id. at 2706.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied

the Milkovich test by incorrectly focusing on whether or not it
could be proved that plaintiff opposed "municipal power" for the
3
city of LaVerkin prior to his election as Mayor of the City.

3

The Court of Appeals framed the issue as follows:
West's public position is an objectively verifiable
fact. At trial, West may present his evidence to show
his public support of the project; defendants may then
present their evidence to prove his public opposition
to municipal power.
The jury must then determine

Footnote continued on next page.
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The correct inquiry is not on the literal words of the
statement, but on the connotation of the statement, i.e., that
West intended to mislead or deceive the voters by opposing municipal power during his campaign for Mayor.
The offending language —

"Terry West, when running for

Mayor, was opposed to it [municipal power] —
cally distinct questions.

raises two analyti-

First, there is the literal meaning of

the words themselves —

i.e., did the plaintiff support or oppose
municipal power before the election? 4 Second, what connotation
arises from the context of the statement, i.e., did plaintiff
intend to deceive the voters when he opposed municipal power during his campaign for Mayor?

The first question debatably may be

provable (the trial court held it was not because there was no
objective, independent proof as required by Milkovich), the second question clearly is not.

The majority opinion of the Court

Footnote continued from previous page.
whether West supported
prior to the election.

or

opposed

municipal

power

Slip Op. at p. 11.

Obviously, it is not defamatory on its face to falsely accuse an elected
official of opposing a public issue such as municipal power.
Any possible
defamatory meaning must come from the context of the statement.

-10-

of Appeals erroneously focused exclusively on the f i r s t question,
while ignoring the more important second question.
The t r i a l c o u r t s analysis, which was rejected by the
Court of Appeals,
l i z e d in Milkovich.

i s consistent with the factual analysis

uti-

In Milkovich, the offending statements were

contained in an a r t i c l e

implying that a high school

wrestling

coach had l i e d under oath in a j u d i c i a l proceeding by giving t e s timony contradictory to prior testimony he gave at an administrat i v e hearing.

In concluding the statements implied facts capable

of being proved or disproved and therefore not e n t i t l e d to cons t i t u t i o n a l protection as opinion, the Court noted that:
A determination of whether p e t i t i o n e r
l i e d in t h i s instance can be made on a core
of objective evidence by comparing, inter
a l i a , p e t i t i o n e r ' s testimony before the OSHA
board with h i s subsequent testimony before
the t r i a l court.
Id. at 2707. (emphasis
added).
The Milkovich Court further noted that unlike a "subj e c t i v e assertion" that someone l i e d ( i s afforded constitutional
protection),

the defamatory

implication

in Milkovich was "an

^
West could have opposed (or supported) municipal power p r i o r to h i s
e l e c t i o n as Mayor for a myriad of reasons, including, among o t h e r s , (1) that
he t r u l y believed h i s p o s i t i o n was sound (2) t h a t he believed municipal power
would benefit himself, the c i t y , the s t a t e or the public e n t i t y or (3) t h a t he
believed he could p o l i t i c a l l y gain by h i s p o s i t i o n . As the t r i a l court corr e c t l y held, none of these possible connotations are susceptible of being
proved true or false by "independent objective proof."
-11-

articulation
tiff's

of an o b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e

testimony

in Court

tional protection).

event," i . e . ,

(which i s not e n t i t l e d t o

plain-

constitu-

I d . a t 2707.

The "core of

objective

evidence" a v a i l a b l e

to

prove

whether a statement i s t r u e or f a l s e , which was so e s s e n t i a l t o
the Milkovich r e s u l t , i s simply absent from t h i s c a s e .

This i s

so because i t i s not provable as fact t h a t p l a i n t i f f intended to
. .
7
deceive the v o t e r s on the issue of municipal power.

This court

should accept c e r t i o r a r i t o consider the important question of
the proper a p p l i c a t i o n of Milkovich and thereby avoid

chilling

robust debate on p o l i t i c a l issues in the S t a t e of Utah.

°
The t r i a l court' s d e c i s i o n dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s claims against Goodey
with r e s p e c t to the statement that p l a i n t i f f attempts to "manipulate the
press" may be affirmed on t h i s ground as w e l l .
'
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s a l s o g i v e s appropriate c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the
type of speech involved -- p o l i t i c a l speech.
The i s s u e of "municipal power"
was a heated controversy in the community of LaVerkin and was a major i s s u e in
the 1988 c i t y e l e c t i o n s . The public debate surrounding municipal power was an
e x e r c i s e of fundamental core p o l i t i c a l speech that the F i r s t Amendment was
e s t a b l i s h e d to encourage and f o s t e r . To adopt the p l a i n t i f f ' s view -- that he
need merely deny the p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n a t t r i b u t a b l e to him or produce a
s e l f - s e r v i n g document purporting to s e t forth h i s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n and thus
obtain a jury t r i a l -- s t r i k e s at the heart of the F i r s t Amendment's " v i t a l
guaranty of free and uninhibited d i s c u s s i o n of public i s s u e s , " Milkovich. Id.
at 2707.
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III. THE REFUSAL BY THE COURT OP APPEALS TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OP WHETHER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AFFORDS GREATER PROTECTION TO THE PRESS
IN THE AREA OF PROTECTED OPINION THAN DOES
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS LEGALLY INCORRECT
AND SQUANDERS A RARE OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER
DEVELOP THE STATED CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN AN IMPORTANT AREA OF THE LAW.
This case presented the first opportunity since the
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal for a Utah appellate court to address the question of what protections, if any, are independently afforded to
Q

expressions of opinion under Utah's constitution.

Rather than

avail itself of this opportunity, the Court of Appeals, relying
9
on three of its prior decisions, summarily refused to consider
the state constitutional issue on the grounds that constitutional
issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

(Slip Op.

at 7, n.5.)

The Court's cursory treatment of the issue i s
for two reasons.

°
The court
long-standing role
and s e v e r a l s t a t e s
2d 235 (N.Y. 1991)
constitution).

First,

contrary to the majority's

flawed

assertion,

i n Milkovich i n v i t e d s t a t e courts to reassume
their
as the primary developer of s t a t e and common law p r i v i l e g e s
have done s o . E . g . . Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski. 77 N.Y.
( r e c o g n i z i n g an opinion p r i v i l e g e based on New York's s t a t e

9

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d
1268 (Utah App. 1990); and State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991).
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the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

i s s u e was r a i s e d in the t r i a l

court.

Second, and more importantly, each of the t h r e e c a s e s r e l i e d upon
by the majority opinion involved circumstances where an a p p e l l a n t
was seeking r e v e r s a l of a v e r d i c t or judgment entered below on
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds not r a i s e d below.

In such circumstances,

where a t r i a l judge does not have the opportunity t o consider an
issue,

it

i s u n f a i r t o overturn h i s or her d e c i s i o n on grounds

not r a i s e d for c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

Here, however, the

i n v o l v e an a p p e l l e e who seeks not r e v e r s a l ,
the t r i a l

court's

decision.

Thus,

the

circumstances

but affirmance,

fundamental

problem

of
of

u n f a i r n e s s t o a t r i a l court of overturning a d e c i s i o n on a b a s i s
on which t h e t r i a l court had not considered, i s t h e r e f o r e absent.
This i s why t h i s court has recognized the ''long standing

rule"

t h a t an a p p e l l a t e court may affirm a judgment of a lower court
"on a ground other than t h a t r e l i e d on by the Court."

Cox v.

Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1988) c i t i n g Spor v. Crested Butte

iU

Defendants' Second Affirmative Defense to p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint averred
that "The Statements complained of are expressions of opinion and are protected under the F i r s t and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States and A r t i c l e I . Sections 1 & 15 of the Utah State Constitution"
(emphasis added). (R. 146). The s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue was o r a l l y argued
at the hearing on defendants 7 motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, a
t r a n s c r i p t of the hearing, which involved only legal argument, was not
requested.
Moreover, the issue was extensively t r e a t e d by respondents in
t h e i r appellate b r i e f and oral argument and was the primary subject addressed
in an amicus b r i e f f i l e d with the Court of Appeals.
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Silver Mining Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987); Thornock v. Cook.
604 P.2d 934 (Utah 979).1:L
IV,

THE MAJORITY OPINION DENIGRATES THE PROPER
ROLE OP THE TRIAL COURT BY REJECTING THE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD ORDINARILY APPLIED IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
INVOLVING ACTUAL MALICE ISSUES IN FAVOR OF A
LESSOR STANDARD WHICH MANDATES A JURY TRIAL
I F THERE EXISTS A "POSSIBILITY" THAT A JURY
"MIGHT" FIND ACTUAL MALICE.

The Court of Appeals r e j e c t e d the t r i a l c o u r t ' s holding
that

first

amendment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

compelled West t o

present

" c l e a r and convincing" evidence t h a t Hogun and Goodey acted with
a c t u a l malice and held t h a t Hogun and Goodey were not e n t i t l e d t o
summary judgment because West came forward with s u f f i c i e n t

evi-

dence t o demonstrate t h e " p o s s i b i l i t y " t h a t a jury could

find

t h a t they acted with a c t u a l malice with r e s p e c t t o the July c o l umn.

(Slip Op. a t 12-16.)

These holdings f l y in the face of the

Supreme C o u r t ' s decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.

11
It i s ironic that the same court which has chastised the bar of this
state for not adequately briefing state constitutional issues ("until such
time as attorneys heed the c a l l of the appellate courts of this state to more
fully brief and argue the applicability of the state constitution [citations
omitted] we cannot meaningfully play our part in the judicial laboratory of
autonomous state constitutional law development,'' State v. Bobo. 803 P. 2d
1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990)) declined to substantively treat the issue when i t
is squarely presented in a fully briefed and argued context.
-15-

242

( 1 9 8 6 ) 1 2 which held that a public figure libel plaintiff

present

clear

and convincing evidence of

to survive a defendant's

motion for

must

actual malice in order

summary judgment.

Nonethe-

less, the majority opinion's discussion of Liberty Lobby is r e l e gated

to

a

mere

footnote

In rejecting

(Slip

a standard

Op,

of

clear

at

15-16,

n.

and convincing

11) .
evi-

dence, the majority opinion made an anemic attempt to distinguish
this

court's decision

which
interest

expressly

in Cox v. Hatch,

acknowledged

that

761 P. 2d 556 (Utah 1988)

there

is

a First

Amendment

in disposing of libel cases on motion where " i t

appears

12
i n Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, the United S t a t e s Supreme Court held that
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure d i c t a t e s the r e s p e c t i v e
r o l e s of the t r i a l judge and jury and mandates that the t r i a l court consider
the e v i d e n t i a r y burden which the p l a i n t i f f must u l t i m a t e l y bear a t t r i a l when
r u l i n g on a defendant's motion for summary judgment. In a public figure l i b e l
c a s e , t h e p l a i n t i f f must demonstrate actual malice by c l e a r and convincing
evidence, i d . a t 252.
In t h e Liberty Lobby d e c i s i o n , the court recognized the i n e x t r i c a b l e
l i n k between the underlying s u b s t a n t i v e law and the province of the judge t o
determine whether a reasonable jury could find f o r the p l a i n t i f f .
Id. at
249-252. A judge simply cannot determine whether a reasonable jury could find
for the p l a i n t i f f without reference t o the burden that the jury must use i n
determining whether the p l a i n t i f f has met that burden. To hold otherwise, as
did the majority opinion, i s t o return t o the days when a p p e l l a t e courts
expressed t h e i r inherent d i s t r u s t f o r t r i a l courts and denigrated t h e i r r o l e
in the j u d i c i a l process by requiring them t o send a l l cases t o the jury when a
p l a i n t i f f s e t s forth a s c i n t i l l a of evidence i n h i s or her favor. I d .
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t h a t a reasonable jury could not find for the p l a i n t i f f s , "
Liberty Lobby. 13

citing

In a d d i t i o n , a d i f f e r e n t panel of the Court of Appeals
has already held t h a t "in e v a l u a t i n g whether t h e evidence r e v e a l s
a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t ,

t h e court must take i n t o con-

s i d e r a t i o n the eventual standard of proof
its."

at t r i a l

on the mer-

Robinson v.

Intermountain Healthcare, 740 P.2d 262, 264
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) . 14 This Court should accept c e r t i o r a r i t o

avoid damage t o t h e F i r s t Amendment i n t e r e s t s which are p r o t e c t e d
by r e s o l u t i o n of

libel

a c t i o n s on motions for summary judgment

and t o avoid confusion caused by i n c o n s i s t e n t o p i n i o n s from the
Court of Appeals.

13
The m a j o r i t y ' s d i s t i n c t i o n read too much i n t o t h i s Court's statement
d e c l i n i n g to dismiss the complaint on f i r s t amendment grounds. Summary judgment simply was not appropriate on the record before the Cox court because of
the paucity of the record before the court. Id. at 560.
The majority a l s o ignored d e c i s i o n s from t h i s Court which have looked to
federal court i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the Federal Rules as i n t e r p r e t i v e aids for
the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure. See F i r s t Security Bank v. Colin. 817 P.2d
298, 299 (Utah 1991); Capital Citv Bank v. Landes. 795 P. 2d 1127, 1130 (Utah
1990). Under these c a s e s , the holding i n Liberty Lobby i s persuasive authori t y for Utah to recognize a c l e a r and convincing evidence standard when applying Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure in actual malice c a s e s .

1^
I r o n i c a l l y , Judge Jackson, who c a s t the deciding vote
authored the above statement in Robinson. Id. at 263.
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in t h i s

action,

V.

THE MAJORITY OPINION WILL DISCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE EDITORIAL DECISION-MAKING BY PUBLISHERS
AND EDITORS IN THAT THE LONG-STANDING AND
ACCEPTED
JOURNALISTIC
PRACTICE
OF
PREPUBLICATION LEGAL REVIEW MAY NOW BE CONSIDERED AS "EVIDENCE" OP ACTUAL MALICE.
The majority opinion held that prepublication review of

the July article by the Daily Spectrum's counsel may be considered by a jury as evidence that publisher Hogun acted with actual
malice with respect to the July article.

Slip. Op. at 14. Peti-

tioners are aware of no other jurisdiction in the country which
has adopted such an aberrant view, which view was not briefed or
hardly even argued.

The issue has serious implications for jour-

nalism and the efficacy of the attorney-client privilege.

Cer-

tiorari should be granted on this basis alone to allow a thorough
analysis of the issue.
VI.

THE MAJORITY OPINION TRAMPLES WELL-SETTLED
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES DESIGNED TO GIVE
THE PRESS THE "BREATHING SPACE" NECESSARY TO
ENSURE A FREE AND UNINHIBITED DISCUSSION OF
PUBLIC ISSUES.
The Court of Appeals held that evidence that editor

Goodey's knowledge that one of Guldan's sources for the "municipal

power"

statements

was

plaintiff's

political

probative on the issue of Goodey's actual malice.

enemy"

was

Reliance upon

a potentially questionable source simply does not demonstrate
subjective awareness of falsity or give rise to "serious doubts"
concerning the accuracy of information in an article where a
-18-

r e p o r t e r has c o n s u l t e d m u l t i p l e s o u r c e s .
F.Supp.
case,

779,
a

794

(D.

reporter

D.C.

relies

defamatory s t a t e m e n t s ,

1991).15
upon

Secord v. Cockburn, 747

Where,

several

as

in t h e

sources

instant

for

alleged

the f a c t t h a t one of the sources

p l a i n t i f f ' s p o l i t i c a l enemy, i s i n s u f f i c i e n t

is

to r a i s e the

the

infer-

ence t h a t a reviewing e d i t o r e n t e r t a i n e d s e r i o u s doubts concerning the accuracy of the s t a t e m e n t s .
The Court of Appeals a l s o

found t h a t e d i t o r

Goodey's

statements in h i s November column may be considered as

evidence

t h a t he e n t e r t a i n e d s e r i o u s doubts about t h e July a r t i c l e .
"hornbook l i b e l

It

is

law t h a t p o s t - p u b l i c a t i o n e v e n t s have no impact

whatever on a c t u a l malice" because the e x i s t e n c e or n o n - e x i s t e n c e
of

malice

must

be determined

as

of

the

date

of

publication.

Secord, supra a t 792; s e e a l s o , Rueber v. Food Chemical News, 925

J D

-In Secord. the court h e l d that r e l i a n c e upon a c o n v i c t e d f e l o n was not
evidence of a c t u a l malice absent an a d d i t i o n a l showing of surrounding circums t a n c e s that r e l i a n c e upon a p a r t i c u l a r f e l o n would c o n s t i t u t e r e c k l e s s d i s r e gard for the t r u t h .
See a l s o . Janklow v. Viking P r e s s . 459 N.W.2d 415, 421
(S.D. 1991) (evidence that two of defendant's sources were c o n v i c t e d f e l o n s
with obvious motives to defame p l a i n t i f f was properly disregarded on summary
judgment on the i s s u e of actual malice where other sources confirmed a l l e g e d
i n a c c u r a c i e s ) ; Perk v . Reader's Digest A s s o c . 931 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1991)
(where s e v e r a l sources supported a l l e g e d l y defamatory a s s e r t i o n s that mayor
was f i s c a l l y i r r e s p o n s i b l e , evidence that one source was b i a s e d a g a i n s t mayor
and another c o n t r a d i c t e d the a s s e r t i o n s was i n s u f f i c i e n t to defeat magazine' s
motion for summary judgment).
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F.2d 703, 716-17 (4th Cir. 1991).

The Court of Appeals improp-

e r l y considered evidence in Goodey's a r t i c l e w r i t t e n in November
as r e l e v a n t t o h i s s t a t e of mind a t the time of p u b l i c a t i o n

five

months e a r l i e r .
CONCLUSION

I t i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t t h i s panel of t h e Court of
Appeals,

in balancing the r e p u t a t i o n a l

and free

press

scales,

places a heavy thumb on the side of r e p u t a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s .

The

p a n e l ' s low value placed on free press i n t e r e s t s runs counter t o
the d e c i s i o n s of the U.S. Supreme Court and t h i s Court. C e r t i o r a r i review i s warranted and necessary t o r e s t o r e proper balance.
DATED t h i s \*-\\

day of June, 1992.

Attorneys for

ib

Petitioners

In Rueber. the court held that an e d i t o r ' s testimony at t r i a l that she
would have printed the allegedly defamatory a r t i c l e even if she knew some of
the a l l e g a t i o n s contained therein were false was i r r e l e v a n t because i t had no
bearing on her s t a t e of mind at the time of publication. Id.
-20-
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Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Terry West appeals the dismissal of his libel claims against
the defendants. West brought suit for statements made in three
different articles published in The Daily Spectrum newspaper. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
Appellee Rick Guldan, a reporter for The Daily Spectrum,
wrote two articles that were critical of West, the mayor of the
small Utah town of La Verkin. Among other accusations and
criticisms, the articles criticized West for opposing the
purchase of a municipal power plant by the town before his
election, but then reversing his position once elected. The
trial court found that the articles implied that West adopted the
politically popular view in order to get elected and that the

connotation of the articles was that West was Ma liar and the
worst kind of political cheat."
In his first article, Guldan also questioned West's ability
to "keep the facts straight. " Guldan reported that when there
had been a break-in at a business owned by West, West had
initially told the police that nothing was missing, but the
police report subsequently indicated that several rugs valued at
approximately $7,000 had been taken. West's insurance claim,
according to Guldan, valued the rugs at approximately $13,000.
The trial court found that the story implied that West filed a
fraudulent insurance claim.
Following publication of the first article, West met with
the publisher of the paper, appellee Don Hogun, and challenged
the factual accuracy of the article. In particular, he stated
that he had always supported municipal power and that prior to
the election he had sent to the citizens of La Verkin a letter
indicating his support. Hogun was provided with a copy of the
letter to the citizens. West also gave Hogun a rebuttal "letter
to the editor" challenging the many issues raised in Guldan's
article.
Hogun consulted the paper's local counsel who indicated that
the story about the insurance claim was actionable because it was
factual and therefore warranted a retraction if false, but that
the statements regarding West's position on municipal power
constituted protected opinion and no retraction was necessary,
even if the statements were false.
The Daily Spectrum then ran a retraction of the story
involving the $13,000 insurance claim but did not retract its
statements concerning West's change in position on municipal
power. Instead, Guldan wrote a second article challenging the
points addressed in West's rebuttal letter which was published in
the letters to the editor section that same day. In particular,
Guldan asserted that if West was not in fact opposed to municipal
power prior to the election, then he "certainly did a masterful
job of creating an illusion he was."
Several months following publication of the foregoing
articles, appellee Brent Goodey, the managing editor of The Daily
Spectrum, wrote an article titled "How I came to %love' La
Verkin's mayor." Goodey indicated his frustration with West and
La Verkin's planning commission chairman, Phil Phillips, whom
Goodey portrayed as West's "political enemy." Goodey accused
them both of "repeated, and not too subtle attempts to manipulate
the press." Goodey then recounted the efforts of both West and
Phillips to have the paper publish their versions of events in La
Verkin politics.
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West brought suit for the statements regarding his purported
change in position on municipal power, the insurance claim story,
and the charge of attempting to manipulate the press.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Part of this case comes to us as an appeal of a summary
judgment granted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
Our standard of review when considering
challenges to a summary judgment is settled.
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In determining
whether the trial court correctly found that
there was no genuine issue of material fact,
we view the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
losing party. And in deciding whether the
trial court properly granted judgment as a
matter of law to the prevailing party, we
give no deference to the trial court's view
of the law; we review it for correctness.
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Furthermore, ,f[w]e
accord no deference to the trial court's conclusion that the
facts are not in dispute . . . ." Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821
P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991).
The remainder of the case comes to us as an appeal from a
dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where
it clearly appears that the plaintiff or
plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief
under the facts alleged or under any state of
facts they could prove to support their
claim. In determining whether the trial
court properly granted the motion, we must
accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Prows v. Department of Financial Insts.. 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah
1991) (citations omitted).
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RULE 54(b)
The claim against Guldan regarding his initial insurance
story remains before the trial court,1 The trial court certified
all other claims as final and appealable under rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 If a trial court improperly
grants rule 54(b) certification, however, this court does not
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Kennecott Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991). Since
the propriety of rule 54(b) certification presents a
jurisdictional question, we raise it sua sponte. Id..3 Whether
an order is eligible for rule 54(b) certification is a question
of law that we review for correctness. Id.
Our first inquiry is whether the claims against Guldan for
his municipal power statements constitute claims that are
separate from the claim against Guldan for the erroneous
insurance story. In Kennecott, the Utah Supreme Court adopted
the Seventh Circuit's approach for determining whether there are
multiple claims. See Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1104. In simplified
1. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that Guldan's
statements in his second article regarding the initial insurance
story were not defamatory. Inasmuch as West does not address
this ruling in his briefs, we assume that he is not appealing it
and we do not address it.
2.

Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.

3. In light of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decisions
rejecting rule 54(b) certifications, see Bennion v. Pennzoil, 826
P.2d 137 (Utah 1992); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank. 823 P.2d
1065 (Utah 1992); Webb v. Vantage Income Properties. 818 P.2d 1
(Utah 1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co.. 818 P.2d 2
(Utah 1991), we requested additional briefing from the parties.
Even though parties may have a rule 54(b) certification from the
trial court, they typically should include in their briefs a
short discussion on the propriety of the certification in order
to assist the appellate court in determining jurisdiction.
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terms, the inquiry is whether there is a substantial factual
overlap between the issues certified for appeal and the issues
remaining before the trial court. The supreme court indicated
that this inquiry may generally be satisfied by determining
whether the resolution of an issue on appeal would constitute res
judicata of an issue remaining below. Id. at 1104-05.
The substance of West's lawsuit is that Guldan defamed him
several times. West's multiple claims, therefore, are not simply
multiple legal theories being applied to the same act. Cf.
Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1100. Each alleged defamation is a
separate injury giving rise to a separate and distinct claim.
The resolution of a given libel claim arising from one statement
would not have a res judicata effect on the other libel claims
arising from the other statements. The claims against Guldan
arising from the municipal power statements may therefore
properly be severed from the insurance claim that remains below.
The claims against Hogun and Goodey are also properly before
us, but for a different reason. Rule 54(b) provides that if
multiple parties are involved, the trial court may "direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
. . . the parties." The supreme court's recent analysis
regarding the separateness of claims simply does not apply to the
certification of final judgments against separate parties. There
is no dispute as to whether Hogun and Goodey are separate
parties. All claims against them are final and they have no
unresolved matters remaining below. They are therefore entitled,
under rule 54(b), to have the appeals brought against them
decided now so that their legal status is not suspended
indefinitely due to the pendency of the matter remaining below.
ANALYSIS
Opinion Privilege
In both of Guldan's articles he accused West of changing his
position on whether La Verkin should purchase its own power
plant. The first article contained the following:
Terry West says the city council should
listen to the people. The people spoke last
November in a general election on the issue
of municipal power. The people said they
didn't want it, and Terry West, when running
for mayor, was opposed to it. However, the
first thing West did as mayor was ignore the
wishes of the people (claiming they weren't
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qualified to make that decision) and
reactivated the municipal power issue.
Apparently West believes you should only
listen to the people when they agree with
you.
In the second article, Guldan stated the following regarding
the municipal power issue:
I said Mayor West had been opposed to
municipal power during the election. The
mayor claims he never took that position.
Several La Verkin citizens, however, have
told me that prior to the election they were
under the impression West was opposed to
municipal power, which is why they voted for
him.
Phil Phillips, who serves as chairman of
the planning and zoning commission, said West
came to him after the election and said he
was changing his position on municipal power
and would support it. If West never actually
came out before the election and said he was
opposed to municipal power, he certainly did
a masterful job of creating an illusion he
was.
Despite the trial court's conclusion that the statements
were actionable because they could be found defamatory,4 it
4. Defendants asserted below that these statements could not be
found defamatory by a reasonable jury. By considering the
environment in which the statements were made, the trial court
correctly ruled otherwise.
Of course, to determine whether or not the
statement is defamatory one must consider the
statement and its meaning in the context in
which the statement was made and not in a
vacuum. This allegation of a change of
position was made following a hotly contested
election in a small community where
candidates lost or won depending upon their
announced position regarding municipal power.
The voters had, prior to the election,
expressed their opposition to the acquisition
of a power distribution system by the City of
La Verkin. The voters were therefore likely
to elect those whose [sic] shared the
(continued...)
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granted partial summary judgment to Guldan, ruling that his
municipal power comments were absolutely protected under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.5
The trial court applied Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990), in ruling that Guldan's
comments were constitutionally privileged. In Milkovich. the
Supreme Court effectively eliminated any claimed or perceived
constitutional privilege for "opinion" while creating a new
analytical framework for applying the right to free speech as a
4.

(... .continued)
opposition espoused by the majority. Under
those circumstances, it is clear that a
candidate who would espouse opposition to
municipal power to get elected and then
immediately pursue a pro-municipal power
agenda as Mayor of the city would be viewed
as a liar and the worst kind of political
cheat. To suggest that those who trusted
such a man and voted for him because of his
announced intentions would not, following his
change of heart, have at least contempt for
him borders on the ridiculous. The
statements of the defendants, if made as
assertions of fact, falsely and with actual
malice, would clearly be defamatory as they
would hold the plaintiff up to contempt,
hatred, and ridicule in his community.

5. Defendants, joined by amicus curiae Society of Professional
Journalists, urge this court to adopt an opinion privilege under
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution. It appears
from a review of the record, however, that defendant did not
raise this state constitutional argument below. "[W]e generally
will not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the
appellant raises on appeal for the first time.11 State v. Webb,
790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). ,f[T]he proper forum in which
to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state
constitutional interpretation is before the trial court, not, as
typically happens . . . for the first time on appeal." State v.
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). §eg also Zions First
Nat. Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah
1988) ("great benefit" may be derived from trial court's view on
legal issues). Inasmuch as defendants' state constitutional
arguments do not qualify for any of the exceptions to this
general rule, see State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah
App. 1991), we do not address them. They may, however, properly
be addressed on remand.
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shield against libel suits. West asserts that the trial court
misapplied Milkovich and that Guldan's comments are not
absolutely privileged. We agree.
In Milkovich. a newspaper reporter implied that a wrestling
coach, Michael Milkovich, had committed perjury about a fight
during a wrestling match between his home team of Maple Heights
High School and the visiting team from Mentor High School.
Following the altercation, the Ohio High School Athletic
Association (OHSAA) conducted a hearing. OHSAA placed the Maple
Heights team on probation for a year and declared the team
ineligible for the next state tournament. Several parents and
wrestlers sued in state court for a restraining order against
OHSAA's ruling. Milkovich testified in the state court
proceeding. The trial court enjoined OHSAA's ruling on due
process grounds.
The next day, a column appeared in the local newspaper with
the heading, "Maple beat the law with the xbig lie. ,H Id. at
2698. The column implied that Milkovich had committed perjury in
the state proceedings. "Anyone who attended the meet, whether he
be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or [an] impartial observer, knows
in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after
each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." Id.
(quoting Milkovich v. The News-Herald. 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21,
545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321-22 (1989)).
Milkovich brought suit against the reporter and the
newspaper. After the case had made several trips up and down the
appellate ladder, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
"the Ohio courts' recognition of a constitutionally-required
^opinion' exception to the application of its defamation laws."
Id. at 2701.
The defendants in Milkovich relied upon the following dicta
appearing in Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct.
2997 (1974), for the proposition that opinion is absolutely
protected by the First Amendment. "Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas." 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S. Ct. at 3007 (footnote
omitted).
The Supreme Court pointed out that the foregoing quote from
Gertz was merely a "reiteration of Justice Holmes' classic
x
marketplace of ideas' concept," see Abrams v. United
States. 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S. Ct. 17, 22 (1919) (Holmes, J.
dissenting), and that the term "opinion" in the second sentence
should be equated with the term "idea" in the first. Therefore,
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the Court concluded, "we do not think this passage from Gertz was
intended to create a wholesale defamation exception for anything
that might be labeled ^opinion.'" Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
In rejecting any "opinion" privilege, the Supreme Court
reasoned that an unqualified opinion privilege would disrupt the
delicate balance between the constitutional need for vigorous
public debate and the legitimate state interests in protecting
personal reputations.
[W]e think the " *breathing space/M which
"*freedoms of expression require in order to
survive,'" Hepps. 475 U.S., at 772, 106
S.Ct., at 1561 (quoting New York Times, 376
U.S., at 272, 84 S.Ct., at 721), is
adequately secured by existing constitutional
doctrine without the creation of an
artificial dichotomy between "opinion" and
fact.
Id. at 2706.6
The Supreme Court also reasoned that a wholesale exception
for opinions would ignore the fact that "expressions of Opinion'
may often imply an assertion of objective fact," id. at 2705, and
gave the following example:
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John
Jones is a liar," he implies a knowledge of
facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones
told an untruth. Even if the speaker states
the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if
those facts are either incorrect or
6.

The Utah Supreme Court has echoed the same thought:
The need to provide the media with a margin
for error is most clear and compelling in
cases involving public officials and public
figures. The requirement of actual malice in
the constitutional sense provides that margin
for error which permits the freest flow of

infQnp^tjon UKelv tg be of importance %n
deciding matters of public import, without
extinguishing all protection for reputational
interests.
Seegmiller v. KSL. Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981) (emphasis
added). Seg also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1988)
(Free speech does not "always prevail against all other values,
such as those protected by the state law of defamation.").
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incomplete, or if his assessment of them is
erroneous, the statement may still imply a
false assertion of fact. Simply couching
such statements in terms of opinion does not
dispel these implications; and the statement,
"In my opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as
much damage to reputation as the statement,
"Jones is a liar."
Id. at 2705-06.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on whether a statement implies
a false fact when criticizing an individual indicates that there
is a significant difference between (1) criticizing an
individual's actions, and (2) falsely reporting an individual's
actions. The former is constitutionally protected speech, the
latter is not. ,f[T]here is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless
error materially advances society's interest in ^uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate on public issues.'" Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 340, 94 S. Ct. at 3007.
The Supreme Court's test in Milkovich for whether a
statement, or the connotation of a statement, is actionable is
quite simple: it is actionable if the statement is "sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false."
Milkovich. 110 S. Ct. at 2707. In applying the Milkovich test to
the present case, we must determine whether the connotation that
West opposed municipal power in order to be elected was
sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proven false.
Guldan's criticism of West is unequivocally based on the
implied factual assertion that West opposed municipal power
before the election. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning from
Milkovich. we conclude that if the underlying factual assertion
that West opposed municipal power prior to the election is false,
then the assertion that he opposed municipal power prior to the
election in order to get elected must also be false.
The trial court erroneously reasoned that since only West
could truly know his position before the election, Guldan's
report7 of his change in position could not be proven true or
false. The trial court failed to recognize that it is West's
7. The trial court ruled that Guldan's comments were his
"interpretation" of the pre-election position of the Mayor and
were therefore "opinion." Such a conclusion is directly contrary
to Guldan's own portrayal in his second article of his earlier
(continued...)
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public position, not his private view, that is at issue. West's
public position is an objectively verifiable fact. At trial,
West may present his evidence to show his public support of the
project; defendants may then present their evidence to prove his
public opposition to municipal power. The jury must then
determine whether West supported or opposed municipal power prior
to the election.
West presented to the trial court a group of letters which
had been sent to all citizens of La Verkin prior to the election.
The main letter weighed the pros and cons of municipal power and
concluded: "With all this in mind and after studying the many
good arguments on both sides of the issue . . . we feel that we
should purchase the power system." The letter is signed by Mayor
West along with several other members of the city council who
supported the purchase. Letters were also included in the packet
from council members who opposed municipal power. The trial
court ruled that the letter was insufficient to raise a question
as to whether West in fact opposed municipal power before the
election. Such a conclusion was incorrect. The letter clearly
indicates that West was taking a pro-municipal power position
before the election. The letter therefore creates a material
question of fact as to West's pre-election position.
We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the
connotations of Guldan's comments were not factual enough to be
susceptible of being proven as true or false. Either West did,
or he did not, publicly oppose municipal power prior to the
election. If he did not oppose municipal power, then it cannot
truthfully be said that he opposed it for political gain. If a
jury finds that West publicly opposed municipal power prior to
the election, West will have failed to prove that the statements
were in fact false and his libel claim will fail. If, on the
other hand, a jury concludes that West publicly and consistently
supported municipal power prior to the election, then any
connotation in Guldan's articles that he opposed municipal power
in order to get elected would, as a matter of logic, be proven
false.

7. (...continued)
statements•
In my last column, I addressed areas of
concern I had about the Mayor's actions. I
believe I addressed them in a singularly
unopinionated format. All I have done is
presented the facts which were available to
me, and left any conclusions to the reader.
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Since it is possible for the connotation of Guldan's
articles to be proven false by proving the underlying factual
assertion false, we hold that Guldan's articles are actionable.
The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment.
Even though we reverse the summary judgment because Guldan's
articles were not absolutely privileged as "opinion," we
emphasize that they are protected under the Supreme Court's
traditional First Amendment analysis. West must therefore still
prove on remand that Guldan acted with actual malice.
Actual Malice
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants Hogun
and Goodey because it concluded that no jury could find that they
published the Guldan articles with "actual malice." The
constitutional requirement of "actual malice" requires that the
plaintiff prove that the publisher of the statement either knew
the statement was false or had a reckless disregard for the truth
of the statement. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 27980, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964).
As to Guldan's first article, West asserts that the failure
of Hogun and Goodey to investigate its accuracy prior to
publication evidenced a reckless disregard for the truth. Hogun
and Goodey assert that they had no duty to investigate before
publishing because it was permissible for them to accept Guldan's
article as true. Whether Hogun and Goodey had a duty to
investigate the accuracy of Guldan's article is determined by
their subjective mindsets in publishing.
[The] cases are clear that reckless conduct
is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would
have investigated before publishing. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publications. Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or
falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325
(1968).
West had the burden to produce evidence showing that Hogun
and Goodey had "serious doubts" as to the accuracy of Guldan's
articles. After reviewing the record, we are unconvinced that
West ever made such a showing as to the first article. Hogun
never read the first article before publishing and Goodey
indicated that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the
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article. West offered no evidence to contradict their claims.
We therefore affirm the granting of summary judgment in favor of
Hogun and Goodey regarding Guldan's first article.
We reverse, however, as to the second article. West claims
that circumstantial evidence proves that Hogun and Goodey had
"serious doubts" as to the truth of Guldan's second article.
West argues that once he informed Hogun of the inaccuracies in
the first article and provided him a copy of his pre-election
letter showing his support of municipal power, and once Hogun
informed Goodey of West's complaints, Hogun and Goodey would have
had serious doubts.8 Defendants maintain that such
circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove actual malice.
We disagree.
The subjective determination of whether [a
defendant] in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of the statement may be
proved by inference, as it would be rare for
a defendant to admit such doubts. A court
typically will infer actual malice from
objective facts. These facts should provide
evidence of negligence, motive, and intent
such that an accumulation of the evidence and
appropriate inferences supports the existence
of actual malice.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d 189, 196
(1st Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) aff'd. 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.
Ct. 1949 (1984).
Hogun contends that the following undisputed facts demand
summary judgment because they negate any reasonable likelihood
that a jury could find that he acted with actual malice. First,
Hogun did not review the second article. Second, Hogun consulted
his managing editor and outside legal counsel. Finally, based on
advice of legal counsel, Hogun (a) caused a retraction of the
insurance statement because counsel advised that it was the only
false factual statement, (b) caused West's letter refuting
Guldan's initial accusations to be published, (c) undertook no
further investigation of the matter, and (d) instructed legal
counsel and managing editor to review Guldan's second article
before publication.

8. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130, 157-58, 87
S. Ct. 1975, 1992-93 (1967) (article was published with little
initial investigatory effort and after plaintiff had notified
defendant that story was inaccurate).
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Hogun's assertion that the foregoing facts demand summary
judgment is erroneous. While they might be persuasive to a jury,
they do not support a motion for summary judgment because they do
not foreclose the possibility that a jury might find actual
malice. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. Ml U.S. 242, 249,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970) (moving party must "foreclose
[] the possibility of the existence of certain facts" from which
the jury could infer a conspiracy)).
West asserts that alternative inferences arising from the
same evidence tend to show that Hogun entertained serious doubts.
For example: Hogun would not have consulted legal counsel if he
did not have serious doubts; Hogun's knowledge that the insurance
story was inaccurate would cause him to doubt the accuracy of the
rest of the article; Hogun would have stood by the first article
without publishing West's rebuttal letter if Hogun did not have
serious doubts; Hogun's failure to investigate further or review
the second article was an attempt to protect himself from suit;
Hogun instructed his legal counsel and managing editor to review
the second article because he had serious doubts about what
Guldan might write given the inaccuracies in the first article.
West also asserts that Hogun's investigation and retraction
of the insurance story due to legal advice that it was the only
actionable statement shows a reckless disregard for truth.
According to West, Hogun only did what was necessary to avoid
legal action, while disregarding the truth or falsity of the
other statements. West also points to Hogun's failure to cause
his pre-election letter to the citizens to be mentioned in the
second article as a deliberate attempt to avoid any indication
that the initial article was erroneous. The foregoing
inferences, while clearly debatable, appear reasonable and
therefore create a disputed question of fact.
Goodey similarly asserts that the following facts negate the
possibility that a jury would find that he acted with actual
malice: (1) Goodey believed, based on his own editorial judgment
and the advice of legal counsel, that Guldan's article merely
reflected Guldan's opinion; (2) based on legal advice, Goodey
believed that the appropriate response was to print West's letter
containing his "opinions," let Guldan respond with his
"opinions," and let the readers draw their own conclusions; and
(3) based on legal advice, Goodey made no further investigation.
Once again, the foregoing facts do not preclude a jury from
finding actual malice. They are simply persuasive of Goodey's
position. Whether or not Goodey thought the statements were
legally protected opinion, and whether Goodey thought that the
appropriate response would be to publish West's letter and
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Guldan's response, are immaterial facts in determining whether he
had serious doubts as to the statements' actual truth.
Also, whether Goodey relied on the advice of legal counsel in
deciding not to investigate further is immaterial to the question
of whether he personally had serious doubts as to the accuracy of
Guldan's accusations.9
West asserts that Goodey must have had serious doubts about
the accuracy of Guldan's report once he learned that Phil
Phillips was the source of the municipal power statements. As
Goodey himself wrote in the third article, Phillips was West's
"political enemy." Goodey himself accused Phillips of repeated
attempts to manipulate the press, and of trying to "nail" Mayor
West based on "unsubstantiated comments." West argues that
Goodey must have known Phillips was an unreliable source and that
further investigation was necessary.10
Viewing the accumulation of circumstantial evidence and the
possible inferences in favor of West, we conclude that Hogun and
Goodey were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.11 Hogun and Goodey did not foreclose the possibility of a
9. We reject any argument that reliance upon legal counsel
somehow shields a defendant from a defamation suit. Reliance
upon legal counsel simply does not figure into the constitutional
formula created by the Supreme Court. The proper focus is on a
defendant's efforts to publish the truth, not the defendant's
efforts to avoid legal liability. One's reliance upon legal
advice as to what course of action should be followed to avoid
legal consequences, simply does not prevent a plaintiff from
proving that the publisher had "serious doubts" about the
statement when it was published.
10. "[Rjecklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons
to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his
reports." St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S. Ct. at 1326. See,
e.g., Curtis Publishing C Q w 388 U.S. at 157-58, 87 S. Ct. at
1992-93 (defamatory matter, which was not "hot news," from
suspect source was printed without substantial independent
support); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co.. 240 S.E.2d 812, 815
(S.C.) cert, denied, 436 U.S. 945, 98 S. Ct. 2847 (1978) (author
published article after being told that the information provided
by informant, the respondent's former sister-in-law, was "biased,
unreliable, and untrue, and that the publication of the article
would damage respondent").
11. Defendants urge this Court to depart from our traditional
summary judgment analysis when free speech is involved. They
(continued*..)

910066-CA

15

jury finding that they acted with actual malice. They presented
evidence which could support a jury's finding in their favor, but
the evidence does not mandate such a finding. Whether or not
Hogun and Goodey had actual malice in allowing the publication of
the municipal power statements in the second article therefore
remains a material disputed fact and summary judgment was
improper.
Manipulation of the Press
The third article in this case, "How I came to xlove' La
Verkin's mayor," was written by Goodey. He discussed the ongoing
political conflict between Mayor West and Phil Phillips, the
chairman of La Verkin's planning commission. Goodey wrote: "The
problem I have with the two gentlemen is their repeated, and not
too subtle attempts to manipulate the press." Goodey then
recounted several attempts by West and Phillips to get their
versions of La Verkin politics printed. The article also related
11. (...continued)
urge us to adopt the federal civil procedure requirement that a
libel plaintiff produce "clear and convincing" evidence that the
defendants acted with actual malice. See Anderson. 477 U.S. at
254, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. We decline defendants/ invitation since
the inconsistent analysis set forth in Anderson requires trial
courts to weigh the evidence while at the same time prohibiting a
weighing of the evidence. See id. at 265-66, 106 S. Ct. at 2519
(Brennan, J. dissenting). We also decline to provide special
procedural requirements for libel defendants in addition to the
substantive constitutional protections. See id. at 268-69, 106
S. Ct. at 2520-21 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Contrary to the
dissent's assertion, the Utah Supreme Court did not approve the
Anderson analysis in Cox. 761 P.2d at 561. The supreme court
acknowledged the preference for resolving defamation claims on
the pleadings where appropriate, as indicated in Anderson. and
then stated, •• [nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to
dismiss the defamation claim on the grounds discussed above."
I£. The standard of review analysis set forth in Anderson was
never even discussed.
Even if we were to adopt the federal approach set forth in
Anderson, it would not alter the result of this appeal. As the
Supreme Court itself said, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor," Anderson. 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513, and
"the plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only
present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his
favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that
requires a trial." Id. at 257, 106 S. Ct. at 2514 (emphasis
added). Such a standard has been met here.
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how each accused the newspaper of covering up the errors of the
other.
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss all
claims relating to the third article because it found that the
statements were not, as a matter of law, libelous. Libel is
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1988) as follows:
"Libel" means a malicious defamation,
expressed either by printing or by signs or
pictures or the like, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the
honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or
publish the natural defects of one who is
alive, and thereby expose him to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule.
A trial court has a duty in a libel case to make a
preliminary determination whether the communication could be
considered defamatory.
Whether the publication of an alleged
defamatory statement . . . is capable of
conveying a defamatory message is initially a
question of law.
The tort of defamation protects only
reputation. A publication is not defamatory
simply because it is nettlesome or
embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because
it makes a false statement about the
plaintiff. Thus, an embarrassing, even
though false, statement that does not damage
one's reputation is not actionable as libel
or slander. If no defamatory meaning can
reasonably be inferred by reasonable persons
from the communication, the action must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Only
if a court first determines that a
publication might be considered defamatory by
a reasonable person is there a fact issue for
the trier of fact.
Cox v. Hatch. 763 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
The trial court concluded in the present case that "the
charge of manipulation of the press could not possibly give1 rise
to a defamatory meaning in the minds of reasonable jurors.' We
disagree. The term "manipulate11 clearly has a possible negative
connotation. One of its definitions is "to control, manage or
play upon by artful, unfair or insidious means especially to
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one's own advantage.M Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (unabridged) 1376 (1986)• "Manipulation" is defined
as "management with use of unfair, scheming or underhanded
methods especially for one's own advantage <swing the balance of
political power . • . by manipulation —Paul Blanshard>
manipulation is one of the dirtiest words in the new lexicon —
W.H.Whyte>." Id.
Inherent in the accusation that West repeatedly attempted to
manipulate the local press, and in the conduct reported, is the
connotation that West did so in order to control the information
disseminated to the public. While reasonable persons might
debate whether such a connotation impeaches West's honesty,
integrity, and reputation and whether it holds him up to public
hatred, ridicule, or contempt, the possibility of the debate
requires a ruling in West's favor.12 Since it is debatable
whether the accusation was defamatory, we must draw the inference
in West's favor and conclude that a reasonable juror might
consider the accusation defamatory. See Cox, 763 P.2d at 561.
We therefore hold that Goodey's article is actionable as libelous
and the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to
dismiss.13
CONCLUSION
With regard to defendant Guldan: The summary judgment as it
relates to the municipal power statements made in both the first
and second articles is reversed and remanded.
12. The dissent asserts that it is a "mainstream public
expectation" that politicians would attempt to manipulate the
press. We do not share such a cynical opinion. Nevertheless,
the point is that it is the duty of the jury to determine, given
the political climate and the totality of the circumstances in
their community, whether the accusation of manipulating their
local press in fact held West up to public hatred, ridicule, or
contempt in their community. Only the jury can make such a
determination and we are not justified in removing it from them
based on our own personal views and expectations of politicians.
13. In holding that such statements may be found to be
defamatory by a jury, we do not imply that West must prevail on
remand. We are only holding that the legal threshold of
defamation has been crossed and whether or not the statements are
in fact defamatory must be decided at trial. The defenses that
may be raised by defendants, such as truth and the absence of
actual malice, are also questions of fact that remain to be
determined at trial.

910066-CA

18

With regard to defendants Hogun and Goodey: The summary
judgment as it relates to the first article is affirmed; the
summary judgment as it relates to the municipal power statements
made in the second article, however, is reversed and remanded;
the dismissal of the cause of action arising from the third
article regarding manipulation of the press is also reversed and
remanded.

&^CC 10, %£~J\
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

GARFF, Judge (dissenting):
I dissent. I would not reach either the state or federal
constitutional issues, but would affirm the judgment on the
ground that the statements are not defamatory as a matter of law
because they do not "impeach [West's] honesty, integrity, virtue,
or reputation or publish his . . . natural defects or expose him
. . . to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Cox v. Hatch.
761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988); Utah Code Ann. S 45-2-2(1) (1988).
"Whether the publication of an alleged defamatory statement
. . . is capable of conveying a defamatory message is initially a
question of law." Cox, 761 P.2d at 561. Thus a trial court's
first task is to determine whether, as a matter of law, a
statement was capable of conveying a defamatory message, id. On
appeal, we review independently this initial legal determination.
Cox is directly on point. Similar to the present case, the
plaintiffs in Cox appealed a dismissal of their defamation claim.
The alleged defamatory statement was a photograph published in
Orrin Hatch's campaign literature during his 1982 campaign for
reelection to the United States Senate. Plaintiffs were
employees of the United States Postal Service and were members of
the American Postal Workers Union. The photo portrayed Hatch
talking to plaintiffs at their place of employment. The photo
was included in an eight-page political flier entitled "Senator
Orrin Hatch Labor Letter," distributed by Hatch's "Union Members
for Hatch Committee." Plaintiffs allege the photo defamed them
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because it implied they endorsed Hatch for reelection and that
they were Republicans.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in part
because the implications that plaintiffs were Republican or that
they supported Hatch were not defamatory as a matter of law. Id.
at 562. The court held that "attribution of membership in a
political party in the United States that is a mainstream party
and not at odds with the fundamental social order is not
defamatory." Id. The court further held that "attribution of
support for a candidate from one of those parties" is not
defamatory. Id; see also, Frinzi v. Hanson. 140 N.W.2d 259, 262
(Wis. 1966) ("Being charged with being a good, luke warm or
nonmember of a political party is not libelous."). The court in
Cox concluded:
However offensive the photograph in this case
may have been to the plaintiffs, it could
not, as a matter of law, have damaged their
reputations or subjected them to "public
hatred, contempt or ridicule." In sum, the
complaint failed to state a claim for relief
based on defamation.
Cox. 761 P.2d at 562.
Cox noted, with approval, other cases which held that
statements regarding political positions or affiliations were not
defamatory as a matter of law. Id. at 562; see, e.g.. Frinzi.
140 N.W.2d at 262 (accusation by Democratic Party Chair that
Democratic candidate was endorsed by certain Republicans who
supported weakening anti-gambling laws, and that candidate
considered running as an Independent not defamatory as a matter
of law); Rawlins v. McKee. 327 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Ct. App.
1959) (per curiam) (accusation that political candidate was
radical who was financed by labor bosses not defamatory as a
matter of law); Manasco v. Walley. 63 So. 2d 91, 95 (Miss. 1953)
(statement that candidate for reelection to the house lost
funding for state roads by removing them from priority list not
defamatory as a matter of law).
Other cases have likewise held that accusations alleging
mainstream political positions or activities are not defamatory
as a matter of law. See, e.g. . Exner v. American Medical Ass'n,
529 P.2d 863, 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (fluoridation); Shields
v. Booles. 38 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931) (pro parimutuel
law) .
Here, the trial court concluded the articles were capable of
conveying the message that West was "a liar and the worst kind of
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political cheat," This conclusion greatly exaggerates the import
of the statements and is erroneous as a matter of law.
Municipal power is clearly a matter of public concern.
"Communications to voters by an elected official . . . which
appropriately pertain to a political campaign are a matter of
public interest." Cox, 761 P.2d at 560. The statements
regarding West's position on municipal power do not directly
imply West intended to deceive voters, nor do they imply he lied
about his prior position. The statements say only that his
position changed after the election. Moreover, any position, or
change of position, regarding municipal power is a mainstream
political position and not "at odds with the fundamental social
order." Id. at 562. Thus, the statements are not defamatory as
a matter of law.
Neither is the accusation that West attempted to manipulate
the press defamatory as a matter of law. The trial court
correctly concluded that "the charge of manipulation of the press
could not possibly give rise to a defamatory meaning in the minds
of reasonable jurors."
The majority claims the statement is actionable because
there exists a "possibility of the debate" that an accusation of
manipulation is defamatory. The majority, relying on a secondary
definition in Webster's, found the sentence actionable because
one of the many definitions of the word "manipulate" has a
negative connotation.
I disagree with this analysis. First, the same edition of
Webster's provides other, preferential definitions of the word:
"handle or manage esp. with skill or dexterity," "to treat or
manage with the mind or intellect," "to control the action or
course of by management: utilize by controlling and managing."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) 1376
(1986).
More importantly, the notion that West exercised power over
the press is not, as a matter of law, defamatory. The accusation
that a political leader or a political candidate would attempt to
manage or to exercise influence over the press is a mainstream,
public expectation and, again, is "not at odds with the
fundamental social order," and thus is not defamatory. Cox. 761
P.2d at 562.
Courts have concluded that even stronger words used against
political leaders and candidates are not actionable as a matter
of law. ££S, 3,gT, Miskovskv v. Oklahoma Pub. Co.. 654 P.2d 587,
594 (Okla.) ("scurrilous defamation" and "gutter theatrics" not
actionable), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 923, 103 S. Ct. 235, reh'a
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denied, 450 U.S. 1059, 103 S. Ct. 479 (1982); Good Gov't Group v.
Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572, 576 (Cal.) ("recalcitrant,"
"machinations," "infamy" and so forth used against former city
council member not actionable), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.
Ct. 2406 (1978).
I also dissent as to the majority's rejection, in note 11 of
its opinion, of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Anderson held that, in cases of summary
dispositions involving libel, the plaintiff must produce clear
and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with actual
malice. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-54, 106 S. Ct. at 2512-13.
This approach was acknowledged approvingly by the Utah Supreme
Court in Cox, 761 P.2d at 561. The Cox court acknowledged "a
First Amendment interest in disposing of libel cases on motion
and at an early stage when it appears that a reasonable jury
could not find for the plaintiffs." Id.
In conclusion, I would affirm the trial court's summary
judgmeijt^enmiy dismissal on tjie ground that the statements are not
a matter oj^jfcw, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 4 5-2-
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Appendix "B"
Relevant Constitutional Provisions
And Statutes

Religious and Political Freedom
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. Const. Amend. 1
Freedon of Speech and of the Press - Libel
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain
the freedom of speech or of the press. In all
criminal prosecutions for liebel the truth may
be given as evidence to the jury; and if it
shall appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and
the fact.
Utah Constitution Art. I, Sec. 15
Libel and Slander Defined
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Libel" maens a malicious defamation,
expressed either by printing or by signs or
pictures or the like, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the
honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or
publish the natural defects of one who is
alive, and thereby to expose him to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule.
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1)(1991)
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Appendix "C"
1. June 27, 1988 Op-Ed Column
2. July 2, 1988 Op-Ed Column
3. November 20, 1988 Op-Ed Column

Turf battles can s\oN growth of region
Reporters are some of the most
Jealous, and most paranoid people
you would ever want to meet Collectively, they have an ego the sue of
the National Debt, and «IIMMI! as
fragile
One of the bigger problems
resulting from this is "turf battles"
which sometimes erupt over who
should be covering
a
story
Reporters are often suspicious, and
even hostile if someone dares to
violate the sanctity of their "heats"
These battles cause us to lose sight
of our common objective
turning
out a quality newspaper II shouldn i
matter to a reporter who gets a
story, as long as the pa|>cr gets it, in
a timely fashion
Sometimes communities have the
same basic pioblems as reporters
do Political infighting and bickering
over real or imagined territorial
rights can serve as a biuderance lo
positive growth for the entire area
A few years back, a lens and
eyeglass manufa< tuicr was con
sidenna relocating in southern Utah.
They had three possible communities in mind, and sent a team to
investigate the feasabihty of such a
move, according lo a sixtkesman for
the company Ka<it of the three com
munities however, apparently spent
as much lime trying to put down the
other two communities as they did
trying to present themselves, and the
region as a whole in a good light
Thslr actions loft bad tested In tits
mouths of the visitors The end result
was that the three cunimunilics end
ed up convincing the company not to
relocate here at all
"The local atmosphere was not
conducive for us to make the move to

Utah," the, spokesman said
The company is now located In
another state, and employs more
than 100 people in good paying light
manufacturing jobs.

Rick
Guidon
At the paper, when the infighting
and turf battles get out of hand, we
have an editor who quickly puts
issues, and people in their proper
perspective Citizens should do the
same with their community officials.
We must learn to work together for
the growth of the entire region
Pray on it" is one of the favorite
expressions of La Verkin Mayor
Terry West
Terry West claims l,a Verkin is his
home, and he loves it. As mayor, he
is constantly telling the citizens there
Is a need to bring In business and improve the tax base Yet he located his
own business - which lie had every
right to do — in Springdale, adding
substantially to that community's
tax base
Terry West is a citizen of Utah lie
has to be, he's mayor of a Utah city
Yet Terry West refuses to get a Utah
driver's license Mis reasoning is he
wants to retain his Wyoming license
(where he ssys he owns a home) so
he won't lose his resident hunting
privileges, even though he is no
longer living in Wyoming.
Terry West avoids paying for
license plates, as you and I have to

do, by utilizing dealer plates from his
Salt Lake City dealership Dealer
plates are Intended for demonstrator
t ars, and while West's use of them on
his private vehicles may not violate
the letter of the law. It certainly apl>ears to violate the spirit of the law.
Terry West says the city council
should listen to the people The people spoke last November in a general
election on the issue of municipal
power The people said they didn't
want it, and Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed to it.
However the first thing West did as
mayor was ignore the wishes of the
people (claiming they
weren't
qualified to make that decision) and
reactivated the municipal power
issue Apparently West believes you
should only listen to the people when
they agree with you Now that the
police issue has beep dealt with, you
t a n be sure municipal power will
rear its ugly head once again
Terry West, who feels he is
qualified to make a major decision
based upon "the facts'* surrounding
municipal power apparently has
trouble keeping his own "facts"
straight A case in point goes back to
a break in at his store, Indian
Village, on the night of Jan 2 Short
ly after Washington County Sheriff'a
Deputy Norm Swapp arrived, it waa
believed nothing had been taken,
that no entry of the building had been
made However Swapp's report, filed
Jan. 4 suddenly listed a loss of
several rugs valued at nearly 17,000.
And the insurance claim filed by the
mayor was for more than $13,000. A
classic case of not neccesarily keeping one's "facts" straight
At a recent city council meeting.

West tried to iet a conditional use
permit pushed through •Iter the
regular meeting. The conditional use
permit would nave granted a beer
license to a newly opened local
garage run by a friend of West's
Whose interests is the mayor really representing? Pray on it.
la Kfemorlam
This is a tribute I meant to run in
my column last week, but •pace
limitations prevented me from doing
so Louis L amour, one of the most
prolific and entertaining authors of
western novels, died recently froir
lung cancer It somehow seems an
unfitting end to a life which spanned
eight decades, and produced more
than 100 novels that have entertained
generations and helped preserve a
part of our heritage
The popularity of L'Amour's works
is attested by the fact his books have
sold more than 200 million copies
worldwide, and more than JO have
been made into motion pictures, in
eluding How the West w*s Won
I enjoyed most of his works, having
always looked forward to the
publishing of each new book The
legacy his words have left la great.
but the loss his death has wrought is
even greater.

•••••
CUDOS ANII ACCOLADES, at the
request of fellow staff writer Loren
Webb, to the St George Plannin
Commission for understanding In*
value of keeping people informed.
They are great about notifying, well
in advance, adjacent
property
owners of requested toning changes.
It's too bad more communities don't
make the same effort, to the same
extent, as this august body does

One mayor said go & one mayor said stay
Editor'3 note: We are running Mr.
UuUlans column on the same thy as
the letter to the alitor from f a
Verkm Mayor Terry West, to Mfttcft
$t refers, ftn- the convenience of our
rra«4rrs in cotnparmg the two sides
of the issues mentioned It might prate helpful to resd Mr West1* hotter
first I on will find it untier the PuMic
Forum heading.
Mayor Terry West wrote a letter to
the editor In response to my las! column (June 271 The mayor raises
some issues In his letter which I
would like to address lurther
first, I was asked to leave a
meeting in l a Verkin. hy M.iyor
West who at the time was a little
peeved over something else I liad
written. I stayed, not because of any
promises made to anybody, IKJI
because Hurricane Mayor Dewey
llardcastle threatened to leave I lie
meeting II I wasn't allowed to May.
The meeting was a closed meeling to
discuss the police and lire contiact
with Hurricane Present at Hie
meeling were llardcastle. Hurricane
recorder Clark Fawcell and tCouncilman Dirk t'arr Represent intf l a
Verkin were West, l a Verkm City
Manager Hon Chandler and Councilman l a n e Black more I was in attendance at the request ol Mayor
llardcastle Alter that meeting, I did
agree with Mayor West to try and
communicate better.
"Write what I mean, not what I
M y . " was how he phrased his reaurst I ha.e attempted to do just
thiit Olten there have tiren limes
since then when I have licen able lo
support the mayor bemuse ol toller
communication with luni I hope In
the luture to continue to <lo so, hut In
promising lo communicate with the
mayor ami make sure I ilou'l mis
quote him, I In no way |»roiiiiscd to
only print news which presents him
In a good liijhl
Tins is all well and g<fod, IHJI has
nothing to do with Hie specific
statements I made in last week* col
umn As mayor, T e n y West is a
public liguie. m the public eye. and

Ihcretoi e subject to a certain amount
of scrutiny.
In bis rebuttal to the first item In
my column concerning the location
of bis business, he says it is his wile's
business He later lij nis letter refers
to it as "our business " Regardless,
It doesn't alter the fact It Is located In
Springdalc, adding substantially lo
that community's tax hose. Mayor
West, in his rebuttal, slates U
Verkin doesn't have "Its act
together "

Rick
Guidon
One iMiint I had hoped to make In
the original column, and which la
supported by the mayor's rebuttal, la
that Terry West apparently doesn't
have IIIIII h faith in the future ol the
city lie is supposed to be leading.
In item two, concerning license
plates, he refers to his dealer plates
as a "fringe benefit. In my column, I
did not accuse him of breaking the
law, liut rather pointed out he is taking advantage of a loophole Aa
previously stated, he Is a public official. m the public eye, and
therefore subjecti Ito a little criticism
for his willingness to utilise loopholes
for iiersonal advantage
In Ins icbutfal to item three, concerning bis driver's license. West
says he doesn't recall ever refusing
to get a Utah driver's license Yet he
admits lie doesn't have one, even
though Utah State l a w (41 2 104)
specifically states a person who has
lieen residing here for more than 90
days must get a Utah drlver'a
license
As West so rightly points out, hy
keeping his Wyoming Driver's
license, he retains his resident hunting (Nivileges in that state And he
once a^ain refers to it as a "fringe
benefit ', one which under Utah law.

he isn't even entitled to
In item four, I said Mayor West
had been opposed to municipal
power during the election. The
mayor claims he never took that
position Several l a Verkin cltlsena
however, have told me that prior lo
the election they were under the Impression Weal was oppnsod lo
municipal power, which u why they
voted tor him
Phil Phillips, who serves as chairman of the planning and toning commission, said West came lo him alter
the election and said he was changing his position on municpal power
and would support i t I I Weal never
actually came out before the election
and said he was opposed to
municipal power, he certainly did a
masterful job ol creating an illusion
he was
In rebuttal to Item live where Weal
claims he never said the people
weren't qualified to make a decision
on m0ntci|ial power. Anybody who
attended a l a Verkin city council
meeting knows that Isn't true. The
mayor has publicly stated on
numerous occasions that the people
didn't have the Information they
needed to make an Informed decision
and that the vote ol November was
therefore invalid In his rebuttal
Weal aaid if was the reaponaiblllty af
the elected officials lo spend the peW
pie's money the wav they want ll
spent.
The
people said
last
November they didn't want the issue
ol municipal I power pursued any further. Hy insisting on pursuing
municipal power. West's actions support his public statements Indicating
the people weren't qualified lo decide ,
on public power.
Item six In my column dealt with
the break in at Indian Village.
Nowhere in my column did I accuse
the mayor ol any lorm ol
malleasance Use of (he words insurance fraud are his. and hia alone.
To quibble a bit, In his letter the
mayor list* the current claim from
that burglary at $4,700 According to
Leslie Mai at American State Insurance, holders of the policy at the

time of the break in, the claim la
•4.S7S This does not accuee the
mayor ol anything, but it doea stress
the apparent flexibility with which
the mayor tosses around "facta" and
"figures"
Item seven, wherein I eeld |he
mayor tried to push through a beer
license under the eulee of a conditional use permit, I stand corrected
In my apparent mlsue of (he word
"friend r As to the facta aa I
reported them, I stand by what I
wrote Alter a motion lor adjourn
men! had already been passed, the
mayor tried to reconvene lor a quick
approval-of the conditional use permit to allow the sale of beer by a
Micheal Beams Mayor West has In
formed my editor he had met Mr.
Beams for the first time that day. Wo
have no reason to doubt the validity
of that statement This la all totally
beside the point The point to. the
conditional use permit did not have
the required approval of the planning
and toning commission, according to
PAZ Chairman Phil Phillioa
In my last column, I addressed
areas of concern I had about the
Mayor's actions I believe I addressed them in a singularly tanoptnlonated format. All I have done la
presented the facta which were
available to me, and left any conchi
i to the reader.
KUDOS and eccefedee to Marshall
Wright of Cedar City for pointing out
my ongoing misspelling of the word
kudo which formerly appeared In
this column as "cudo."
I wish I could proffer some clever
explanation lor the misspelling, such
as It is a cutesy version, or perhaps
an old Gothic spelling of the word,
but the truth of the matter is. I was
Just plain spelling it wrong
For picking up on something which
no one here at the paper did. I hereby
bestow this week's Armchair Editor
Award to Mr Wright, along with my
sincere thanks

How I came to 'love' LaVerkin's mayor
dlacuaa
discuss Mr Watt
West and Mr Phillips
Phillip* for
mti^iin and
A M ccontroversy
mtmmv
know that criticism
1 an ™ ^ J ^ V e ? the tnaa facta s moment it is not s closely guarded come with the territory, apparently
secret
that
tha
two
disagree
frehe has chosen to believe this
thin* yoy should » • * * " • » « ? mJ**
quently That, of course, is their
newspaper has joined m some
U (hat " " ' ^ ^ ^
S S nam
diabolical conspiracy against him
Tht problem 1 have with Use two
Gee. I wtah I had time to master*
tantieme* ta their rwpeated. seal not
mtnd a plot against you. Mr West. I
us subtle, attempts to maiUpuiait>the
would use the time, if I had it. to play
in
golf or be with my family rather than
The' I - U w w *(Jlt
« t 0 M1 t, Ct tWh "
to
conspire - but I do wish 1 had tht
a^fera
a Hit* "*"
^P*
,'
time.
dfi f ?o Man Uatt or Jofin. right?
r«n there »r*. ( p o m U m € t0 t , m t You should know, Mr West, your
a/ferences in tht goapl" accorilkgauona that Mr. PtuUipa cleverly
ding to Mayor West andthe Joepel
manjupiatea news coveraajs art
Brent
a m r * * to U Verkm Planning
.without merit It isn't that he haaaVt
Goodty
tried. He, like you. Mr Weat, bos
i oeiieve it ia n»gh time both
>/
mod to convusee us that his gtsptJ is
lemJemen reaUxe several things.
tht true goapti. But in hie case, ana)
- Mr Weat does not have the
yours, snd everyone tlsea, wo must
Mr Phillips, <
mart* cornered on truth, wtsdcm,
to give coverage of
and rtgniaoueness. Neither does Mr. has called venous poops* hare at tht continue
events baaed on our bast
Phillips Neither do l Neither do any Sportrvm to reveal soano "hot" Up newsworthy
professional
judgment - whether
of my staff members Each of the about alleged improprieties by you hke it or not.
above are Just human beings, fully Mayor Weat. He has. no doubt, beta
1 will choose to believe, at this
frequently dumppotmad whet wo
capable of making errors.
that your motives are the
- A newspapers job is not to havt not attempted to "nail" tht point,
purest,
Mr. West, snd that Mr.
decide what is gospel Our job is to mayor baaed at issssshstintislsd Phillips also
has nothing but wanting
report what is going on - what is statements or items takea tat of the bast for La
Vert in behind his acsaid in public meetings, what
A good example would be a remark tions But since each of you seem to
moyon and cttisane have on their
we are in league with tht other
mind - as sccuratery and fairly aa Mr. Weat made at a city council think
- and the other ta the dtviT - how
possible it ta up to each individual to meeting several weeks sgo. 1 don t can
both
of you be correct?
then deads which "gasper they remember the exact statement now,
but to our reporter it seemed obvious
subscribe ta.
Mr. Phillips, we have attempted to
- News coverage of public Mr West made the statement m p t verify, each of your "hot' tips about
meetings is always abridged. A radio and people at tha meeting laughed Mr. West, but many turn out to*bt
or television report may run a few along with tha mayor. But when tha mountaina made from molehills, so
seconds to s minute or two. A remark was not quoted in our story, we tanore them and you think we
newspaper account may bo a few in- Mr Phillips accused us of protecting coddle your political enemy.
ches) up to as many as 30 or 30 inches and covering up for the mayor.
Mr. Weat. we nave come to expect
Give mo a break, Mr. Phillips If
- or § meeting « * 7 rwuit ei en u>
nisi story and fallow-up pieces about wo quoted every funny remark made your regular visits and letter* ta tail
issues raised in the mooting, thus in )eat by St. Georgt Mayor Karl us how wo art out to got you.! htpt
ilhww$ umo for research end infer* Brooks, wo wouldn't havt room for this doesn't coma as too otg a blow,
views. Citiiens who wish to know tht news, and these who don't know but we seldom even think about ytu
every word spoken in a two or three Mr. Brooks would think St. George between visits.
I wonder why the same reporters
hour meeting wtU attend the had a stand-up comic for a mayor,
meeting. A reporter s job is »to rather than a wtae and witty, kind can cover tht samt kinds of
meetings - including some with conhighlight the meeting, not report human being.
Then thert it Mr. West Unlike troversy as great as the LaVerkin
every snoots, cough and summer.
With these things in mind, let's mort experienced poliucians. who police issue - and it does not result
,t . ^ —II.«*
--»»urf thes
thai cos****
csssssai borauao I

i* Use
IK« mayors
. < M M of
~J Humcsne.
u,.»~*« M Santa
c.
is
Clara, Ivma. Meaquite. St. George or
Cedar City, running m to charge us
with bus. snd personal vendeitj*
Maybe they are aware ihry »m
nr^or bo unanimously lewd and
suved by all iMir conaiuuenuv
sybe they recognise senna principals, business managers, retired
executives from Large eoporanon*.
and even council members nave *
right to tspresa their opinions and
their opinions may oe 'just as
newsworthy as those of a mayor
As for the implication in your let
ter. Mr West, we covered up Mr
Phillips actions in Wednesday
mghta council meeting,1 may 1 aaa
why we would want to There is a
simpler explanation, sir Since La
Verkin doosn t send us copies of their
meeting agendas like most local
communities do. and since they nor
mally moot just twice a month, our
reporter — having attended a
matting tht previous week - forgot
that meeting had been postponed a
weak snd thus missed lacs week s
La Vert is City Council meeting.
Thursday morning a reporter called
several principal ngures from the
meeting and wrote a story About the
same time vou came in to our offices.
Mr. Weat. You did indeed leave your
information about Mr. Phillips
"making a spectacle of Issnseif
Unfortunately, I didn t get a chance
to see it until after Thursdays
deadline, but a reporter was assigned to follow through on Use metier
Your letter — which wea saparenUy
designed to embarrass Mr PhiUipa
and, ones again, use our newsprint to
publish accusations about how unfair
we art to you - may now suffice until the ultimate resolution of the matter with Mr Phillips and Use pi*nnmg commission.

K

I would have much preferred
writing about some mort peaasant
' Mss this week, and 1 normally
it respond to letters in PuMic
Forum, but Mr West and Mr
PhiUipa have worn my patience very
thin.
0
Disagree with our choice of comic
strips, editorial views, or selection of
columnists, if you wish, and you 11
get no armament from me Tell me
we should here covered your birthday party, instead of a major community event, snd III defend your
nsht to chat opinion. But ! cannot
allow such specious charges u Mr
West makes to go unanswered When
a pubuc figure like Mr West accuses
us of bias, or of being manipulated oy
another pubbc figure, he is playing
with tht liveuhooos of dotena of
newspaper employees and. more »nv.
portanJy, toying with a vital component of our free society A newspaper
without credibility J m big trouble
Notict, I did not say a perfect
newspaper. Wo make mistakes, but
they art hstssst mistakes.
Of cstsfta. if Mr. West could convines readers ta LaVenua the
newspaper ta biased against him
then anything which appeared in the
paper about rum would be suspect m
thttr eyas I wonder if that ta what he
si hoping ta achieve if politicians
art allowed ta operate in a news
vscuum. tht society is in big trouble
Still, ! can t, far the life of me.
figure out what Mr West ihinka we.
would havt ta gain by consptnng
against tht m^ot of the beautiful Utile) csjMMftMt» where he lives.
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Appendix "D"
Rulings by the Fifth Judicial District Court,
The Honorable H. Philip Eves, Presiding
1. Memorandum Opinion November 30, 1989
2. Memorandum Opinion July 25, 1990
3. Memorandum Opinion October 17, 1990
4. Judgment of Dismissal November 13, 1990
5. Summary of Trial Court Rulings
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IK AND FCP THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY R. WEST,
Plaintiff,

1

MEMORANDUM
OPINION

1

vs.
THOMPSON NEWSPAPERS, dba
THE DAILY SPECTRUM,
DON E. HOGUN, BRENT C-OODEY and
RICK GULDAN,

i

Civil No. 89-2*83

Defendants.

The above entitled natter came before the Court for Oral
Argument on November 22, 1989 on the Motion of the Defendants to
Dismiss.

The Plaintiff was represented by himself and the

Defendants, except for Defendant Rick Guldan, were represented by
Randy L. Dryer.

Defendant Guldan was not present nor represented

and did not participate herein.

For purposes of this motion the

Defendant's Statement of Facts was accepted as true by the parties.
The Plaintiff brought an action against the Defendants
for libel resulting from three different newspaper articles which

were published on the editorial page of the Defendant Newspaper.
One of the editorials was authored by Defendant Brent Goocey and
the other two by Defendant Rick Guldan.

At the time of the

publication of these articles, the Plaintiff was the elected mayor
of LaVerkin.

During the campaign for city officials in 1987 the

issue of whether or not LaVerkin should convert to a municipal
power system was hotly contested in that community.

There was

also a substantial controversy about whether or not the City of
LaVerkin should renew its contract with the City of Hurricane for
police services or pursue some other course of action.

The

articles which the Plaintiff claims are defamatory are attached to
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion
To Dismiss submitted by the Defendants and are incorporated in
this Memorandum Opinion by this reference.

The first of the

articles was written on June 27th, 1988, by Defendant Rick
Guldan.

Thereafter, on July 1st, 1988, the Plaintiff submitted a

letter to the editor responding to what he alleged were defamatory
comments in the June 27th, 1988 column.

The letter submitted by

the Plaintiff was published in the Letters To The Editor section
of the Spectrum on July 2nd, 1988.

That letter is likewise

attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by
the Defendants and incorporated herein by this reference.

4?

On July 2nd, 1988, Defendant Guldan responded to the
Plaintiff's letter in the same issue and adjacent to the
Plaintiff's letter to the editor.
On November 30th, 1988, Brent Goodey authored a column
which was published in the Spectrum.

The Plaintiff asserts that

certain statements made in the June 27th, July 2nd and November
30th articles are defamatory.
The Defendants assert in their Kotion To Dismiss that
the Plaintiff's entire Complaint should be dismissed for three
reasons :
1.

That the statements of which the Plaintiff
complains are not defamatory as a matter
of law.

2.

That the statements of which the Plaintiff
complains are not actionable as a matter
of law because they are mere expressions of
opinion.

3.

That the Plaintiff has failed to plead that
he suffered special damages as required
under Utah law.

Prior to commencement of oral argument it was brought to
the Court's attention that the Plaintiff, without obtaining leave

of the Court, had filed with the Clerk an Amended Complaint which
did in fact allege certain special damages resulting from the
defamation.

Counsel for both sides stipulated in open Court that

the Amended Complaint should be filed and that the Motion ^c
Dismiss should be applied to the Amended Complaint.
The filing of the Amended Complaint disposes of the
third basis upon which the Defendants move to dismiss since it
does contain allegations of special damages.
The first basis for the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss i
their claim that the statements of which the Plaintiff complains
are not defamatory.

Section 45-2-2 U.C.A. defines libel as

follows:

(1). "Libel" means a malicious defamation,
expressed either by printing or by signs
or pictures or the like, tending to blacken
the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach
the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation,
or publish the natural defects of one who
is alive, and thereby to expose him to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule."
The Court must make an initial determination as to
whether or not the alleged defamatory statements could possibly
meet that criteria in the minds of any reasonable jury.

In the

case of Cox vs. Hatch, 761 P. 2nd 556, the Utah Supreme Court

said, as follows:

"We acknowledge, however, a First Amendment
interest in disposing of libel cases on
motion and at an early stage when it
appears that a reasonable jury could not
find for the Plaintiff.
If no defamatory meaning can reasonably be
inferred by reasonable persons from the
communication, the action must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Only if a Court first determines that
a publication miaht be considered
defamatory by a reasonable person is
there a fact issue for the trier of fact."

After reviewing the various statements of which the
Plaintiff complains the Court finds that only those statements
made in the column authored by Defendant Brent Coodey should be
dismissed.
press.

Mr. Coodey accused the Plaintiff of manipulating the

This Court finds that the charge of manipulation of the

press could not possibly give rise to a defamatory meaning in the
minds of reasonable jurors within the meaning of the definition
quoted above.

Therefore, the cause of action against Defendant

Coodey is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
With regard to the remaining causes of action which are
attributed to reporter Rick Culdan, the Court finds that a
reasonable person might determine that the offensive language was
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libelous or at least that one interpretation of the offensive
language would constitute libel.

It therefore becomes a matter

for a jury to determine whether or not the recipient of the
language would have assigned the libelous meaning to it.
The second basis for the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss
is that the statements of which the Plaintiff complains were mere
expressions of opinion and even if derogatory are not actionable.
The Defendants argue that the comments of Defendant Guldan as
published in the Spectrum were simply opinions and therefore
entitled to some absolute privilege.

In support of that

proposition the Defendants cite, among other cases, the case of
Ogden °us Lines vs. KSL Incorporated, 551 P. 2nd 222, a 1976 Utah
Supreme Court decision.

Careful analysis of that case reveals

that Defendants misunderstand its holding.
The general proposition of fair comment on an issue of
public concern is treated under the heading of Libel and Slander,
50 Am Jur 2nd, Section 290.
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There the rule is stated as follows:

To constitute fair comment, the pulication must
(1) relate to a matter of public interest;
(2) relate not to a person, but to his
acts, and, except as warranted by
the facts, must not impute dishonorable
motives to one whose work or conduct is
criticized;

(3)
(4)

Generally rust be based on facts
truly stated; and
rrust be an honest and fair expression
on the facts."

In the Odgen Bus Lines case, the Supreme Court stated
these general propositions as follows:
"it is firirly established that matters
of public interest and concern are
ligitimate subjects of fair comment
and criticism, not only in newspapers,
and in radio and television broadcasts,
but by members of the public
generally, and such comments and
criticisms are not actionable,
however severe in their terms,
unless they are made maliciously..."
and a little further on, the Court cites the remainder of the Rule"
as follows:
"...The right of comment is not restricted
to a restatement of the naked facts. As a
general rule it may include the right to
draw inferences or express opinions from
facts established. The soundness of the
inferences or opinions is immaterial
whether they are right or wrong, provided
they are made in good faith and based
upon the truth...ff
The Court then went on to hold in that case,

as follows:
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"we do not find any of the above elements
of malice present in this case from the
evidence before the Court. In order to
prevail, the Plaintiff had the burden of
showing malice on the Defendant's part
in the broadcast of the alleged defamatory
statements.
Since we do not find that the Defendant
made any false statements in said
editorial, it is deemed unnecessary
to consider the Plaintiff's allegation
that Defendant did not exercise due
care to prevent the broadcast of the
editorial. This would be immaterial
in the absence of any false assertions."
Both sides in this case agree that for purposes of this
Motion To Dismiss at this early stage of the proceedings, this
Court must assume that the statements of which the Plaintiff
complains were made falsely and maliciously.

This Court is unable

to find any authority for the proposition that opinions of all
types are subject to any absolute privilege.
authority seems to be to the contrary.

In fact, the

The law of the State of

Utah appears to be that opinions have a conditional or qualified
privilege if they are based on true facts and are not rendered
with malicious intent.

Of course, in the case presently before

the Court, it is uncontested that the Plaintiff was a public
official at the time of the alleged defamation and therefore, he

is required to demonstrate actual malice in the publication of
these statements before he can prevail.

Plaintiff is entitled,

however, to attempt that proof before a trier of fact and
Defendant is not entitled to a dismissal of the action at this
stage.
Therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED
except as to the cause of action relating to the statements made
by Defendant Brent Goodey.

That cause of action is dismissed as

stated above and Mr. Goodey is discharged as a Defendant in this
action.
DATED this
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day of ^^o^A^^tyQ^^

, 1989. *
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IN AND FCR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE" CF UTAH-

TERRY R. WEST,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM
OPINION

vs •
THOMSON NEWSPAPERS, dba THE
DAILY SPECTRUM, and DON E.
HOGUN, BRENT GOODEY and
PICK GULDAN,
Civil No, 890502683
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on
June 7, 1990 on defendants 1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
plaintiff represented himself and

The

the defendants Thomson

Newspapers, Don E. Hogun and Brent Goodey were represented by
Randy L. Dryer.

The parties submitted lengthy memoranda and the

Court also heard their oral arguments.

The Court then took the

matter under submission.
The Court having now reviewed the authorities cited by
the parties as

well as other authorities, now enters the follov/ing

Memorandum Opinion.
CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFF
In his Amended Complaint filed November 13, 1989,
plaintiff alleges that he was defamed by the defendants in
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newspaper articles published on June 27, 1933 (the June article)
and again on July 2, 1938 (the July article).

The June article is

the basis of two specific areas of complaint.

Plaintiff first

alleges he was defamed by statements indicating that he had
advocated a popular opinion about a hotly contested municipal
issue (municipal power) prior to his election to the office of
Mayor of the Town of LaVerkin but that immediately following his
election he had abandoned his pre-election position on the issue
and instead advocated the opposite position, a position much less
popular with the voters in the community.
Plaintiff also contends that the June article defamed
him by statements that he had trouble keeping his facts straight.
In support of that allegation the article cites the example that
after plaintiff's business was burglarized there was at first no
loss reported, then suddenly a loss of nearly $7,000.00 was
reported to the Sheriff and thereafter an insurance claim of more
than $13,000.00 was filed by the plaintiff.
With regard to the July article, plaintiff claims he was
defamed by publication of a separate article by the same reporter
which in essence repeated the same defamatory allegations as the
June article.

The July article was written and published as a
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rebuttal to a letter to the editor which the plaintiff wrote and
submitted tc the defendant newspaper and which the defendants
published in the sa.T.e issue as the July article.
COMMON CRCUITD
The parties have agreed and the Court has ruled that
plaintiff was the Mayor of LaVerkin at all times relevant to this
case and was a public official within the meaning of New York
Times vs. Sullivanf 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

Therefore, in addition

to proving that the statements in the defendant newspaper were
defamatory and false, plaintiff must prove that the statements
were published by each defendant with "actual malice", i.e.: that
the defendants had knowledge that the statements were false, or
published the statements with reckless disregard of the truth'cr
falsity thereof.

The parties likewise agree that proof of actual

malice must be by clear and convincing evidence.
Beyond that there is little agreement between the
parties on the law or its application in this case.

It appears,

however, that the only material factual disputes raised by the
parties revolve around the issues of what evidence and inferences
are to be considered as proof of actual malice and whether the
statements made were fact or opinion.

These disputes raise issues

of law which the Court can properly decide in ruling on a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
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DEFAMATORY FACT VS. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED OPINION
Defendants contend that the statements in the two
articles relating to the plaintiff's change of position on the
municipal power issue are not actionable.

They first assert that

those statements are not defamatory as they do not expose the
plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.

In essence, the

defendants argue that politicians frequently change their
positions on issues and that accusing a public official of such a
change, even if false, does not injure the reputation of the
public official.
eOf course, to determine whether or not the statement is
defamatory one must consider the statement and its meaning in the
context in which the statement was mace and not in a vacuum.

This

allegation of a change in position was made following a hotly
contested election in a small community where candidates lost or
won depending upon their announced position regarding municipal
power.

The voters had, prior to the election, expressed their

opposition to the acquisition of a power distribution system by
the City of LaVerkin.

The voters were therfore likely to elect

those whose shared the opposition espoused by the majority.

Under

those circumstances, it is clear that a candidate who would

f
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espouse opposition to municipal power to get elected and then
immediately pursue a pro-municipal power agenda as Mayor of the
City would be viewed as a liar and the worst kind of political
cheat.

To suggest that those who trusted such a man and voted for

him because of his announced intentions would not, following his
change of heart, have at least contempt for him borders on the
ridiculous.

The statements of the defendants, if made as

assertions of fact, falsely and with actual malice, would clearly
be defamatory as they would hold the plaintiff up to contempt,
hatred, and ridicule in his community.
The issue then becomes whether or not those statements
are statements of fact or constitutionally protected expressions
of opinion.

The defendants contend for the latter position and

the plaintiff for the former.

The line between what is fact and

what is opinion is often difficult to draw.

In the case of Oilman

vs. Evans, 750 Fed 2nd 970 (1984), the Court gave an excellant
discussion of the delicate balancing process which Courts of law
must undertake in this area and suggested an approach which this
Court has applied to the facts of this case.
that opinion and others [see

It is clear from

also Sinaldi vs. Holt, Rinehart, and

Winston, Inc. 366 NE 2nd 1299 (1977); Ogden Bus Lines vs. KSL,
Inc., 551 P 2nd 222 (Utah, 1976)] that determining what

r
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constitutes protected opinions under the First Amendment and
actionable statements of fact is a matter of law and a proper
focus for a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In attempting to make the required determination, this
Court has referred to the exact language of the statements of
which the plaintiff complains.

For purposes of discussion the

text of those statements should be set forth.

In the June

article, Mr. Guldan wrote:

"Terry West says the city council should listen
to the people. The people spoke last November
in a general election on the issue of municipal
power. The people said they didn't want it, and
Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed
to it. However the first thing West did as
Mayor was ignore the wishes of the people
(claiming they weren't qualified to make that
decision) and reactivate the municipal power
issue. Apparently West believes you should
only listen to the people when they agree
with you. Now that the police issue has been
dealt with, you can be sure municipal power
will rear its ugly head once again."
Plaintiff apparently takes issue, primarily, with the
statement "and Terry West, when running for mayor was opposed to
it." (municipal power).

For purposes of the following analysis,

this Court assumes that this statement was false and was made with
actual malice.

The inquiry then becomes whether or not these
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comments are a statement of fact or a statement of the reporter's
constitutionally protected opinion.

For the reasons set forth

hereinafter it is the finding of this Court that these statements
are part of a constitutionally protected statement of the
reporter's opinion.
The writings of the United States Supreme Court as well
as several other State Courts and lower Federal Courts clearly
indicate that great latitude is accorded to expressions of opinion
in the context of public debate over issues of general concern.
The First Amendment protects statements of pure opinion, even if
they are false and defamatory.

(See Rinaldi vs. Holtf Rinehart and

Winston, Inc., ibid., and Oilman vs. Fvans, ibid.)

In the

statement at hand the reporter was expressing his own opinion of
the pre-election opinion of the mayor.

He did not suggest that he

had any unrevealed facts to support his statement and in fact he
gave no supporting facts at all in the June article.

The exact

meaning of his statement is subject to some interpretation as
being opposed to municipal power does not clearly define the
mayor's feelings or statements on the subject nor does it charge
the mayor with any statement or act.

It appears that the

statement was intended as an interpretation by the reporter of the
pre-election position of the mayor.
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To find that such a statement was a statement of fact
such as would subject the reporter to an action for defamation and
a claim for damages would clearly chill legitimate public debate
over an issue cf concern to the community.

It is clear that the

positions and attitudes of public officials on matters affecting
those whom they govern are always subject to analysis by the press
and by the electorate.

One who observes the activities of an

elected official and draws conclusions from that observation, then
forms opinions from those conclusions and states them publicly
should not be placed in jeopardy of legal action as it is
important that the press and the electorate have the freedom tc
express their ideas and to exchange information.

In an arena such

as this no one but the mayor would know all of the facts necessary
tc correctly and precisely define his position on municipal power
and therefore anyone venturing an opinion may misstate it.

But

that danger should not prevent the public from debating the issue
as the importance of public debate on an issue of this nature
clearly outweighs the danger to the mayor of a misstatement of his
position.
In the July article Mr. Guldan, the reporter, wrote:
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"In item four, I said Mayor West had been
opposed to municipal power during the election.
The Mayor claims he never took that position.
Several LaVerkin citizens however, have tcld
me that prior to the election they were under
the impression West was opposed to municipal
power, which is why they voted for him.
Phil Phillips, who serves as chairman of
the planning and zoning commission, said West
came to him after the election and said he was
changing his position on municipal power and
would support it. If West never actually came
out before the election and said he was opposed
to municipal power, he certainly did a
masterful job of creating an illusion he was."
The Court has analyzed the July article and the
statement above quoted using the Oilman vs. Evans standards and
now finds for those reasons stated above and those stated
hereafter that these statements of the defendants are also
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion.

The New York

Court of Appeals has been widely quoted for its opinion of Rinaldi
vs. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., ibid.

In that case the Court

held that even erroneous opinions are constitutionally protected
so that debate on public issues may remain robust and unfettered,
and concerned individuals may have necessary freedom to speak
their conscience.

The Court went on to hold that where one

expresses an opinion and then sets forth the basis for that
opinion, no action for defamation can be maintained.

f
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In the July article Mr. Guldan reiterates, in response
to Mr. rest's letter of the prior day discuting the June
statements, his opinion regarding the payor's change of position
on the municipal power issue.

He then cites "Several LaVerkin

citizens. . ." who he claims have provided him with the
information upon which his opinion is based.

He gees on to quote

the name of one such person, Mr. Phil Phillips, who has in fact in
this case submitted an affidavit in which he admits providing the
information which Mr. Culdan quotes in his July article.

Under

the rationale of the Rinaldi decision it appears that Mr. Guldan's
statements in the July article are statements of pure opinion, the
reasons" for which have been set forth, and therefore are not
actionable.
Plaintiff attempts to counter this position by alleging
that although Mr. Phillips has corroborated Mr. Guldan's
statements in the July article that not all of the sources (the
LaVerkin citizens) which Mr. Guldan later identified at his
deposition as having given him information have given that
corroboration.

The fact that some of the persons who Mr. Guldan

may have talked to prior to the article have not chosen to
corroborate his statement does not create a cause of action where
one would not previously have existed.

/&

It is clear that Mr.

Guldan was entitled to state his opinion on this matter of public
concern without any sources or to quote only Mr. Phillips if he
chose to use a source.

The fact that he also claimed to have

received information from other citizens does not render his
statement of opinion an actionable one.
This Court therefore grants to the defendants and
against the plaintiff that portion of the Summary Judgment
relating to the cause of action in each of the two articles
wherein Plaintiff is alleged to have changed his position
regarding the issue of municipal power.

This Court finds that

those statements are constitutionally protected expressions of
opinion and not actionable statements of fact.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Defendants next argue that Summary Judgment should be
granted to them as to all statements in plaintiff's 1st and 2nd
Causes of Action because plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law,
demonstrate that the statements were made with actual malice.
Before this Court can determine that issue it must first decide
the proper approach to a Motion for Summary Judgment in a
defamation case involving a public figure and the proper standard
of review to be applied.

//
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Rule 55 (c) O.R.C.P. states the general rule regarding
Summary Judgments in this state.

It provides:

"The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."
The plaintiff takes the position that this is the
standard which this Court should employ in deciding the issues in
this case.

The plaintiff would have the Court simply look at the

factual allegations made by the parties and determine whether or
not there are any material facts in dispute.

The defendants

assert, however, that a different and higher standard applies in
this type of case.

They cite for authority the U. S. Supreme

Court decision in Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,, 477 U.S.
(1986).

242

The plaintiff relies on Tavoularease vs. Piro, 759 F. 2nd

90 (1985).

The Court has reviewed both of these cases and

although there may be some superficial distinctions as to the
standard of review involved, this Court finds that the approach
that the two Courts took was generally similar and since the
Anderson decision was decided after the Tavoularease and by a
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higher Court, any differences in the statements of the law
involved in those cases must be resolved in favor of the Anderson
case.
Anderson was a Summary Judgment case.

The Court set

forth a test for Summary Judgment in a public figure defamation
case therein that is slightly different than the general standard
under 56(c) U.P.C.P. although the Court phrased its decision as an
attempt to implement the provisions of that statute.

The Anderson

Court held that in deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment in a
case such as this the trial court cannot weigh the evidence where
conflicts exist in the evidence.

Pather, the Court must take all

of the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom which are
marshalled by the opponent to the Motion (the plaintiff) in its
most favorable light to the opponent to the Motion, and then
decide whether the evidence so marshalled creates a triable issue
for the jury, i.e.: whether there is enough evidence of actual
malice that a reasonable jury could properly find against the
moving party at trial if they believed everything that the
plaintiff presented.

The Anderson Court also held that in making

this determination the court must take into consideration the fact
that the plaintiff will be held to demonstrate actual malice to
the jury by clear and convincing evidence.
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ACTUAL MALICE DY DEFENDANTS
This Court has attempted to apply this test to the case
at hand by analyzing the evidence as to each defendant on each
allegedly defamatory statement.

In his Statement of Material

Facts submitted with his Memorandum of Points & Authorities in
this matter the plaintiff has set forth numerous facts and
arguments which he alleges create a genuine issue of fact on the
issue of actual malice as to each defendant and each statement.
It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff does not contend
that there is any evidence of actual malice as to the defendant .
Hogun relating to the publication of the June article.

Therefore,

application of the actual malice standard for Summary Judgment
will not be discussed as it relates to that article and that
defendant and Summary Judgment is granted to the Defendant Hogun
with regard to the June article.
Having reviewed all of the evidence identified by the
parties and accepting all of the plaintiff's facts as true, the
Court finds that no reasonable jury could find by clear and
convincing evidence that either Mr. Hogun or Mr. Goodey published
either the June or July articles knowing they were false or with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity thereof.
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With regard to the July article the plaintiff alleges
three points on which he relies in support of his claim that Mr.
Hogun acted with actual malice at the time of the publication of
that article.

First, he alleges that following the June article,

he contacted Mr. Hogun personally and pointed out the inaccuracies
in the June article.

Second, that he gave Mr. Hogun some "letters

to citizens" which he alleges somehow demonstrated that he had
supported municipal power prior to the election.

Third, he

alleges that even with the information he supplied, Hogun did no
further investigation and allowed the second article to be
published.
Defendant Hogun is the publisher of The Daily Spectrum.
It is undisputed that he did not review either article personally
but relied on 3rent Goodey, the managing editor of the paper, to
do that.

After receiving the plaintiffs visit, comments, and the

letters to citizens as well as the plaintiff's letter to the
editor on July 1st, Defendant Hogun contacted legal counsel and
spoke with him regarding the newspaper's responsibility.
Thereafter he caused a retraction to be published regarding the
insurance claim statements in the June article.

He then caused

Mr. West's letter to the editor to be published so that Mr. West's

statement of the issues would come before the readership of the
paper,

Mr. Hogun admits that he did no further investigation as

to the truthfulness of the June article's allegations.
Even if this course of conduct is correctly stated, it
does not evidence reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the June or July statements.

A publisher has the right to rely on

a reporter's quotations of his sources without contacting the
sources himself or doing an independant investigation of the
truthfulness of the quotes. [See St. Amant vs. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727 (1958); New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 283 (1964);
and Karaduman vs. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E. 2d 557 (1980)].

Nor

must a publisher take as gospel the statements of a subject of an
article (the mayor).

Rather, the publisher must himself entertain

serious doubts as to the truth of the article before he is
publishing with actual malice (St. Amant vs. Thompson, ibid. )
Plaintiff has presented no evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could rely to find by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hogun
published with actual malice.

This Court has reviewed the

"letters to citizens" which plaintiff demonstrate his pre-election
position.

These letters appear ambiguous and unenlightening to

this Court.

At best they show that some candidates took clear

positions on the municipal power issue at the mayor's request but
the letters do not clearly state Mr. West's position on that
issue.

It is clear as a matter of law that the letters themselves

do net place Mr. Hogun on notice that the statements in the June
article were false.

Nor do Mr. West's denials of the statement as

to his pre-election position and Mr. Hogun had no duty to
investigate the matter further and could rely on the statements of
his reporter.
Accordingly, Summary Judgment is granted against the
plaintiff and in favor of Defendant Hogun on all issues and
Defendant Hogun is ordered dismissed as a party in this case.
The plaintiff claims as a basis for his allegation of
actual malice against Brent Goodey, editor of the The Daily
Spectrum, that Mr. Goodey should have independently investigated
the statements made by Mr. Guldan in his column prior to
publishing those statements.

For the reasons set forth above,

this Court rejects that position and finds that Mr. Goodey had no
such obligation of independent investigation.

The failure to

conduct such an investigation does not indicate the presence of
actual malice, let alone prove it by clear and convincing
evidence*
With regard to the July article the plaintiff basically
alleges that Mr. Goodey, having the information available to him
that the plaintiff had delivered to Mr. Hogun, then had the
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obligation to investigate further before publishing or allowing
the publication of the July article.

Plaintiff arrears to assert

that failure to follow up and investigate in light of the new
information which he had provided to the newspaper constituted
evidence of reckless disregard of truth or falsity.
For the reasons cited above with regard to the defendan
Hogun, these claims are found to be without rrerit.

In St. Arrant

vs. Thompson, ibid./ the sane claim was made in opposition to a
notion for Summary Judgment.

The U. S. Supreme Court stated, in

reversing the Louisiana Supreme Court:

"St. Amant had no personal knowledge of
Thompson's activities; he relied solely on
Albin's affidavit although the record was
silent as to Albinfs reputation for veracity;
he failed to verify the information with those
in the union office who might have known the
facts; he gave no consideration to whether or
not the statements defamed Thompson and went
ahead heedless of the consequences; and he
mistakenly believed he had no responsibility
for the broadcast because he was merely
quoting Albin's words.
These considerations fall short of
proving St. Amant's reckless disregard for
the accuracy of his statements about
Thompson." p. 730.
Still later in the same opinion at pages 732 & 733, we find:

"Nothing referred to by the Louisiana
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courts indicates an awareness by St.
Amant of the probable falsity of Albin's
statement about Thompson. Failure to
investigate does not in itself establish
bad faith."
and elsewhere in the same opinion after citing prior U. S.
Supreme Court opinions on the subject we find:

"These cases are clear that reckless
conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man would have
published, or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publications." p. 731.
Plaintiff has failed to marshall sufficient evidence to
indicate that Mr. Goodey in fact published either article knowing
that the contents were false or in reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of the contents.

Therefore, Summary Judgment is

granted to the defendant Goodey and against the Plaintiff as to
all causes of action and the defendant Goodey is dismissed as a
party to this action.
Plaintiff next asserts that the reporter, Mr. Culdan,
published the statements in the June article and the statements in
the July article with actual malice.
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This Court has previously
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ruled in this opinion that the statements of defendant Guldan
regarding the plaintiff's position on municipal power were
constitutionally protected statements of opinion and therefore not
actionable*

If such had not been the case this Court would have

denied the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the defendant Guldan
on those statements since it appears that there are significant
conflicts in the evidence as to whether the statements were
published with actual malice, sufficient to create an issue for
the jury*
With regard to the statements of the defendant Guldan in
the June article having to do with the insurance claim, this Court
finds that such statements are not expressions of opinion but are
in fact expressions of fact and could be construed to constitute
allegations of criminal or civil wrongdoing and dishonesty.

The

plaintiff has marshalled sufficient evidence to preclude Summary
Judgment as to those accusations in that he has demonstrated that
there is a significant question for the jury as to the defendant
Guldan's sources for that information and whether or not Mr.
Guldan knew that the statement was false.

Given those conflicts,

this Court finds that a reasonable jury could find by clear and
convincing evidence that the statement regarding the insurance
claim in the June article was false and that the reporter knew
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that it v/as false or that he was reckless as to the accuracy of
that statement.

Summary Judgment as to that statement is denied.

Regarding the statement of Defendant Guldan on the
subject of the insurance claim in the July article, this Court has
reviewed that article in its entirety and finds that the
statements contained in that article relating to the insurance
claim are not defamatory.

Even if those statements are false they

would not be such as to hold the defendant up to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule.

On that basis the Motion for Summary

Judgment as to that article is granted.
RETPACTICN AND ACTUAL DAMAGES
The parties have raised an additional issue relating to
the effect and meaning of 45-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as Amended, as
applied in this case.

Defendant claims that since they published

a prompt retraction of the insurance claim statements in the June
article that the plaintiff is precluded from recovering on his 1st
Cause of Action with regard to that portion of the article because
he cannot as a matter of law demonstrate that he has suffered any
actual damage as required under Utah's Retraction Statute.

It

would appear that the defendants would have this Court define
"actual damages" to mean special damages or demonstrable
out-of-pocket costs and losses as opposed to general compensatory
damages.

2/

In support of their positions the parties have cited no
cases

from the State of Utah defining the term "actual damages'1 as

it appears from the statute.

An analysis of other authorities,

however, sheds light on the question.
In the Revised Fourth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary,
p. 467, actual damages is defined as follows:

"Real, substantial and just damages, or the
amount awarded to a complainant in compensation
for his actual and real loss or injury, as
opposed on the one hand to "nominal" damages,
and on the other to "exemplary" or
"punitive" damages."
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 25, Damages, Section 2, p.
616 defines actual damaaes as follows:

"Actual damages covers all loss
recoverable as a matter of right, and
has been said to include all damages
except exemplary or punitive damages."
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 53, Libel and Slander,
Section 189, p. 279, states:

"A successful plaintiff in an action
for libel or slander is entitled to recover
such actual or compensatory damages as are
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the natural and direct or proximate result
of the publication but not speculative or
remote
damaces."
And at section 195(b), p. 285 of the same C.J.S. volume
and article we find:

"Defendant may show in mitigation
of damages that he has published or
made a retraction of, or apology for,
the defamatory words which are the
subject of the action, even, it has been
held, though the retraction was not
published until after the action was
commenced."
Finally, in Gertz vs. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) p. 349,
a U. S. Supreme Court decision, we find the following language:

"The common law of defamation is an
oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery
of purportedly compensatory damages without
evidence of actual loss. Under the
traditional rules pertaining to actions
for libel, the existence of injury is
presumed from the fact of publication.
Juries may award substantial sums as
compensation for supposed damages to
reputation without any proof that such
harm actually occurred."
Later in the same opinion, on page 350, we find;

23
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"We need not define "actual injury", as
trial courts have wide experience in framing
appropriate jury instructions in tort actions.
Suffice it to say that actual injury is
not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed,
the more customary types of actual harm
inflicted by defamation falsehood include
impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering. Of course,
juries must be limited by appropriate
instructions, and all awards must be supported
by competent evidence concerning the injury,
although there need be no evidence which
assigns an actual dollar value to the injury."

This Court therefore holds that if defendants can meet
the test established by 45-2-1 U.C.A.* 1953 as

Amended, with regar

to the adequacy and sufficiency of their printed retraction, they
can limit any recovery to the plaintiff by deleting therefrom any
award for punitive or exemplary damages.

In addition, defendants

can introduce evidence of a printed retraction in mitigation of
any claim for actual or compensatory damages by the plaintiff.
Hov/ever, the plaintiff is not limited in his claim for damages to
his out-of-pocket losses or his special damages but rather is
entitled to compensatory damages in accordance with the
authorities set forth hereinabove if he is able to establish the
elements of liability.

2¥

In Summary then, the Motion for Summary Judgment of the
defendants is GPANTED with regard to the entire July article for
the reasons set forth hereinabove.

In addition, the Motion for

Summary Judgment of the defendants is GRANTED as to defendants
Hogun and Goodey as to the June Article.

There remains for trial

only the clains against the defendant Newspaper and the reporter,
Mr. Guldan, with regard to the statements in the June article
relating to the filing of the insurance claim.
DATED this

9*5^-

day of July, 1990.

J^/PHILIP
.fth District Judge

^r
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M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that en this

4^

.9 19 7 ^

&5^-

day of

, a true and correct copy of the

above and foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to:

Terry R. West, Esq.
P. 0. Box 387
LaVerkin, UT 84745

Randy L. Dryer, Esq.
185 South State Street
#700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
TERRY R. WEST,

)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM
OPINION

vs
THOMSON NEWSPAPERS, dba THE
DAILY SPECTRUM, and DON E.
HOGUN, BRENT GOODEY and
RICK OULDAN,
Civil No. 890502682
Defendants.

This matter came on^ before the Court on October 3, 1990,
the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding on the Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling en the
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiff sought a

rehearing and reconsideration of the decision which was evidenced
by the Memorandum Opinion filed by the Court on July 25, 1990.
Plaintiff was present representing himself and the Defendants were
represented by Randy L. Dryer.

Argument was heard from both sides

and the matter taken under submission by the Court.

Having now

reviewed the matter in its entirety, including the June 21, 1990,
U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Michael Milkovich, Sr.
v. Lorain Journal Co., et al., No. 89-645, (no citation available)
the Court now renders the following decision.

The Milkovich case clarifies an area of defamation law
which has apparently been misunderstood by many Courts across the
country.

In its decision on the Defendant's Motion For Summary

Judgment in this matter, this Court relied on apparently good
authority on both the State and Federal levels in holding that the
statements of which the Plaintiff complains in the June and July
articles which had reference to the Plaintiff's alleged change of
position on the municipal power issue were protected statements of
opinion under the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(See the Court's Memorandum Opinion of July 25, 1990, pages 4
through 11). It is clear that in Milkovich the United States
Supreme Court has now held that there is no "opinion privilege"
under the United States Constitution and that Courts so
interpreting the language in the case of Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S.
323, pgs. 339-340, were in error.

The Milkovich decision clearly

holds that under the U. S. Constitution a statement of opinion is
not actionable if the statement is one relating to matters of
public concern "which does not contain a provable false factual
connotation".

Statements without such provable factual

connotation do receive full constitutional protection. ( See
Milkovich, page 20;

Philadelphia Newspapers Inc., v. Hepps, 475

U.S. 767, page 772).

^

In this case the question is simply whether the
statements of the Defendants regarding the Plaintiff's position on
municipal power contain a provable false factual connotation.
This Court has previously ruled that such statements were in the
nature of opinions.

For the reasons stated in the Court's

Memorandum Opinion of July 25, 1990, on pages 7 through 11, this
Court now finds that the statements regarding the Mayor's opinion
on the position of municipal power do not contain a provable false
factual connotation and that said statements are entitled to full
constitutional protection.

Specifically, this Court finds that it

would be impossible for anyone to prove, given the facts before
the Court in this case, what the precise position before the Mayor
was on the issue of municipal power prior to the election.

The

only person who would have all of the facts necessary to prove
that issue would be the Mayor himself.

This Court finds that

under these circumstances public debate on an important issue of
general concern should not be chilled simply because the figure at
the center of the debate is the only one who knows his precise
position.

If the law were to hold that anyone voicing an opinion

does so at the peril of being contradicted by the public figure
whose opinion is in debate and being subjected to a lawsuit, it is
clear that no prudent person would voice any opinion in such a
situation because the person criticized need only deny the
criticism to set up a winnable lawsuit since his proof would be
the only proof available.

It is the opinion of this Court that

</>i/

the Milkovich decision stands for the proposition that there nust
be independant objective proof available on the "factual
connotation" before the matter may be submitted to a trier of
fact.

The subjective attitudes and representations of the person

criticized are not sufficient proof to meet the criteria of the
Milkovich case.

On the record before this Court there is no

objective independant proof as to what the attitude of the Mayor
was prior to the election and therefore the opinions of the
Newspaper are entitled to full constitutional protection.
Therefore, the prior decision of the Court on the
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment stands.

As requested by

the Plaintiff and agreed to by the Defendant's counsel all of the
orders and decisions of this Court previously entered herein,
including the decision on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration set forth above are hereby certified as final
under U. R. C. P. 54(b) for purposes of allowing an interlocutory
appeal by either side prior to trial.

It appears to this Court

that this case presents important issues of law which should be
resolved by appellate review before the parties in this matter are
put to the expense of a trial.
DATED this

October, 1990.

Court Judge

yU^

M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that on this _
CK^Vt^OA

>

t 19 30

t&tncL

day of

i a true and correct copy of the

above and foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, or
hand-delivered, to:

Terry R. West, Esq.
P. 0. Box 387
LaVerkin, UT 84745

Pandy L. Dryer, Esq.
185 South State Street
Suite £700
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Cd/U^
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RANDY L. DRYER (0924)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
Thomson Newspapers,
Don E. Hogun and Brent Goodey
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

TERRY R. WEST,
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
AND CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b)

Plaintiff,
VS.

THOMSON NEWSPAPERS, dba, THE
DAILY SPECTRUM, and DON E.
HOGUN, BRENT GOODEY and
RICK GULDAN,

Civil No. 89-2683
Judge J. Phillip Eves

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Based on the prior motions of defendants for summary
judgment, the pleadings, depositions, legal memoranda and oral
argument of counsel at the hearings on said motions for summary
judgment, and further based on the Court's Memorandum Decisions
issued July 25, 1990 and October 17, 1990, and upon the Court's
determination that there is no just reason for delay in entering
Judgment

on

the

above-referenced

motions,

and

for

good

and

sufficient

other

reasons,

the

Court

hereby

enters

judgment

against plaintiff and in favor of defendants as follows:
1.

All

claims

against

defendants

Donald

Hogun

and

Brent Goodey contained in plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint are
dismissed with prejudice.
2.

All

claims

against

defendants

Rick

Guldan

and

Thomson Newspapers, Inc. in the second and third causes of action
of

plaintiff's

Third

Amended

Complaint

are

dismissed

with

prejudice.
3.
Newspapers,

The claims against defendants Guldan and Thomson
Inc.

Third Amended

in the

Complaint

first cause of action of plaintiff's
which stem from the publication of an

article dated July 2, 1988 are dismissed with prejudice.
4.

The

claims

against

defendants

Rick

Guldan

and

Thomson Newspapers, Inc. in the first cause of action of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint which stem from publication of the
"municipal power" statements in an article dated June 27, 1988
are dismissed with prejudice.
5.

This Judgment disposes of all claims against all

defendants contained in plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, with
the exception of the claims in plaintiff's first cause of action
against defendants Thomson Newspapers, Inc. and Rick Guldan which
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stem

from statements

in a June 27, 1988 article relating

to

plaintiff's filing of an insurance claim,
6.

Costs are awarded to defendants, but the amount of

said costs shall not be determined or awarded until the remaining
claims are disposed of by adjudication, settlement or otherwise,
at

which

time

defendants

and

the

prevailing

party

on

the

remaining claims shall comply with the cost provisions of Rule
54.
7.

The Clerk of the Court

is ordered

to promptly

enter this Judgment on the Judgment Docket and the Register of
Actions and do all other things necessary to render this Judgment
final, for purposes of appeal, under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of
j

Civil Procedure.
ENTERED this

->

day of November, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

COURT JUDGE
232:102990A
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TRIAL COURT RULINGS
WEST V. THOMSON NEWSPAPERS (Nov. 30, 1989, July 25, 1990, Oct,, 17, 1990)

June Guldan Column

July Guldan Column

November Goodey Column

(Changed Position on Municipal Power)

(Changed Position on Municipal Power)

(Manipulate the Press)

1. no actual malice
- did not review
- advice of counsel

1. no actual malice
- did not review

Donald Hogun 1. no actual malice
(Publisher)
- did not review

Brent Goodey 1. no actual malice
1. no actual malice
(Editor)
- no reason to doubt
- advice of counsel
veracity
- prior history w/Guldan
Rick Guldan
(Reporter)

1. protected opinion
1. protected opinion
- personal observation
- advice of counsel
- city residents

1. not defamatory
- protected opinion

not applicable
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Appendix "E"
Plaintiff Terry R. West's
Letter To The Editor

Mayor speaks
Editor. Spectrum:
!t stem* that I spend more timt
writing articles (letters) for the
Spectrum than anything else, but
wnen you are continually being attacked by one of the staff reporters (
guess it comes with the job of being
mayor.
Aiter being asked to leave a
meeting at La Verkins town offices
for irresponsible journalism several
weeks ago. Rick Gulden apologized
and said that he would be more accurate in the future. At that time I
told him that I didn't cart if he didn't
agree with my statements or actions
but before he wrote about them,
please at least understand them He
promised me that he wouid at least
do that. Since then ht has always
touched base with me before quoting
me or writing about mt as mayor.
Maybe ht didn't think my personal
life was included in that promise1 Oh
well, a promise is only a promise.
Isn t it funny, when you put a little
truth to allegations and half truths
the story or gossip doesn t sound so
good. In answer to Mr Guldan s article of June 27 I respectively submit
the following truths.
I I do not own a business in Sprmgdale but my wife does and I have
spent a lot of time putting on in expansion this spring. She has spent
most of her life helping me m my
other businesses I thought it was pay
back time. But I do have several
million dollars invested in La Verkm.
And 1/ La Verkm ever gets its act
togetMM will invest much more in
U V
,.
2. » ave used dealer plates on
some of my automobiles but I do.
have others registered in my name
and my business names. There are
some fringe benefits to every job.
I'm still trying to find tht fringe
benefits that come with being mayor.
Sometimes the have nots" envy the
"have s '. I hope this is not the case
with my favorite reporter
3 I do not recall ever refusing to
get a Utah drivers license, but 1 do
have just as met a home in Wyoming
as I do in Utah, fully stocked with
everything, including clothing, so
that I can jump on a plant and go to
Wyoming aod stay t months without
taking anything with mt. Hunting in
Wyoming; is a fnngt benefit that
can't be lightly overlooked. Jealous

Rick?
4. tt is just not true that I opposed*
municipal power while I was running
for mayor last November In fact. I
stnt a letter to Ls Verkin citizens
dated October 31, I9f7 encouraging;
tht citizens to vote for municipal
power. "Even though thtrt art risks
ot higher powtr rates in purchasing
tht powtr svstem. how do you get
• « I M M ui uus me I I you don't take
some nska? We do not have a crystal
bail to forecast tht future and it is only our opinions as to what wt should
do." (letter dated Oct 27. 19*7)
Plaasa get your facta straight before
you accuse ma of muutading tht
DtOOit.
5.1 ntvtr said that tht paopit wart
not qualified to make a decision on
municipal powtr. But I have always
said and I still say that the issues involved were so technical that it was
impossible to gat an informed vote
oyerall on tht istut. I have always
said and still do that it was our first
mistake to try to get a straw vote on
such a technical subject Even than
tht vote was St percent against and
44 percent for. this vote was doaa
compared to the vote on the police

issue which was 77 percent against a
police contract with Hurricane and
23 percent for
The big difference with the police
vote, was that the issues were very
simple ones that all have had experience with. Every household has
had to balance a budget and most of
the households in U Verkin had experience with both the county shen/f
and with local police. What issues
could be more simple and qualify for
a straw vote? I always have said and
still do that we the elected should
spend the people's money the way
the people want us to spend it, but we
the elected have the responsibility to
make decisions for the people in
areas that are technical and an informed straw voce is impossible.
6 Before you make allegations of
possible insurance fraud, vou should
check with your attorney to see what
your liability for such allegations
are. But to make the record correct I
will fill you in on the truth. On Jan 2.
198S we did have a break-m at our
business in Spnngdale. and at the
time all we knew was that a rock had
been thrown through the door and it
appeared that no jewelry had been
taken. You would naturally think
that when a jewelry store is entered
that it is jewelry that they are looking for. and it appeared that ail the
jewelry was accounted for It wasn t
until the next day that it was found
that some Navajo rugs valued at
about 113.000 had been taken. This
would make our loss about 1/2 the
retail value. An insurance claim was
filed for $6,7000. What is so strange
about these facta, Rick**
7 It ts not true that at a recent city
council meeting, I tried for a friend
to get a conditional use permit for the
sale of beer pushed through after the
regular meeting. The truth of the
matter is that the permit was on the
agenda and the person was not present when it came up Shortly after
the meeting was adjourned the person came up and asked why his permit had not been considered. We
opened the meeting up again so that
his needs could be considered. No
one had left the room As far as you
calling him my friend all people are
my friends but this friend I only met
that day.
Terry West
Editor's not*: You wiii find a
response to Mayor West's letter in
Mr Gulden's column today.
Regarding item six, Mr. Gulden
was informed by an insurance com*
pany representative the claim was
for $13,000 which is, as it turns out,
the retail value of the missing property and Mr. West's claim was filed
for about naif that amount When
that was brought to our attention by
Mr West we printed a clarification
m Thursdays newspaper. As Mr.
Gulden points out in his column, he
never mentioned, nor was there inference intended, of insurance fraud.
Mr. West introduced the words "insurance fraud.

The Spectrum welcome^
tetters from its readers.
Each letter must include
the writer's name, address
and phone number. Letters
are subject to editing for
space and clarity. Letters
may be addressed .to:
Editor, Daily Spectrum; c/o
the address listed on page
4 of each edition.

